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CHAMI!IERS 01" 
THE CHIEF ..JUSTICE 
February 6, 1986 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
RE: National Treasury Employees Union v. United States (Civ. Ac-
tion No. 85-4106, D.D.C.) 
Synar v. United States (Civil Action No. 85-3945, D.D.C.) 
A three-judge panel of the District Court for the District of 
Columbia (Scalia, J.; Gasch, J.; N. Johnson, J.) is currently consid-
ering a challenge to the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control 
Act of 1985 (commonly referred to as the Gramm-Rudman Act) • The 
Clerk's Office has informed me that a decision will be released tomor-
row at noon. I have directed the Clerk's Office to circulate copies 
of the court's opinion and any related papers as soon as possible. 
The timing is important in this case in part because President 
has already issued a sequestration order pursuant to the Act. That 
order is to become effective on March 1, 1986. Moreover, the Act it-
self provides that "[i]t shall be the duty of the District Court for 
the District of Columbia and the Supreme Court of the United States to 
adva e docket and to expedite to the greatest extent 
the disposition of any" suit challenging the procedures under the Act. 
Section 274(c). Also, even if the District Court concludes that the 
sequestration provisions of the Act are unconstitutional, it apparent-
ly will not be able to issue an injunction against their enforcement 
until this Court completes review of the matter. Section 274(e). 
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The Act provides for a 30-day period for filling a jurisdictional 
statement. It is conceivable, however, that the losing parties will 
file a jurisdictional statement much sooner than that in the hope that 
we will decide the case before the President's order becomes effective 
on March 1. 
I assume the Court will note jurisdiction over any appeal. If a 
jurisdictional statement is filed promptly (e.g., by the end of next 
week), I suggest we order that any response be filed within a very 
brief period. We will then need to consider to what extent we wish to 
order expedited briefing and argument. Our consideration of that 
question, however, can await the three-judge panel's decision and the 
filing of the jurisdictional statement . 
. For the benefit of the Conference, I have attached to this memo-
randum a copy of the Act. 
Hobart Rowen 1hl- ~12() I i" 
The Gramm-Rudman Ruling and the Fed 
When a special federal court panel struck 
down the Gramm-Rudman law's system of au-
tomatic budget cuts, it did more than throw in 
doubt whether the highly touted deficit reduc-
tions will ever take place. 
Because of the legal underpinnings of the 
decision, it also exposed the Federal Trade 
Commission and other regulatory agencies that 
have been considered "independent" -espe-
cially the Federal Reserve Board-to a new 
form of attack: from conservatives who bel~ve 
these agencies should be subordinated to exec-
utive power. 
The shoe has often been on the other politi-
cal foot. For most of the Eisenhower presiden-
cy, Democrats complained about the indepen-
dence of the Fed under chairman William 
McChesney Martin. The Democrats argued 
that tight-money policies pushed by Martin, 
and acquiesced in by Ike, led to three reces-
sions and high interest rates. 
In the 1960 campaign for the presidenqy, 
john F. Kennedy's advisers talked freely of the 
need to fire Martin, or somehow box him in. At 
that stage of history, preservation of the "inde-
pendence" of the Fed became a rallying cry fur 
conservatives. It was so effective that Kennedy 
was forced to tone down his assaults. 
Actually, Kennedy as president and Martll 
}tit it off well, and JFK in 1962 reappointed 
Martin to a four-year term. As most recent 
chairmen have privately acknowledged, the 
American central bank can be independent 
within the government, but not truly indepen-
dent of the wishes of any national administra-
tion. 
All "independence" has ever meant is gen-
eral acceptance of the view that the chairman 
and governors, who have long (up to 14-year) 
terms of tenure, are not part of the usual politi-
cal process. That is, they do not have to fear 
being removed by the president if the presi-
dent happens to disagree with Fed policy. 
The Fed board "was given political indepen-
dence so that it would be able, when necessary, 
to point out that the public interest required a 
halt to inflationary pressures," wrote former 
governor Sherman j. Maisel in "Managing the 
Dollar," published in 1973. 
Now, in the wake of the Gramm-Rudman 
ruling, that sense of security of tenure is pre-
cisely what is being questioned. Bruc~ £Eilit, 
former general counsel of the Fede~~­
nications Commission, now a scholar at the 
American Enterprise Institute, goes so far as 
to say that the decision paves the way for "a 
wholesale re-examination" of past precedents 
supporting the independence of the regulatory 
agencies, and an invalidation of "their indepen-
dence from presidential removal." 
Here's why. In the Gramm-Rudman case, 
the lower court said that the comptroller gen-
eral could not make the final decision trigger-
ing automatic budget cuts: that is a proper 
function of the executive branch, and the 
comptroller general is responsible to Congress, 
not to the presjdent. 
Since the comptroller general cannot be re-
moved by the president, that official cannot ex-
ercise executive powers, the court said. Thus, 
the panel seems to be saying that only some-
one who can be removed by the president can 
exercise executive powers. 
So where does that leave the Fed, and the 
Federal Trade Commission, and other regula-
tory agencies whose governors or commission-
ers cannot be removed by the president (ex-
cept for neglect of duty, inefficiency or malfea-
sance, subject to judicial review)? 
Fed General Counsel Michael Bradfield said 
in a brief conversation that the ruling "raises a 
question, but it's premature to be seriously 
concerned." To adopt the full implications of 
the lower-court ruling, he said, the Supreme 
Court would have to reverse 150 years in 
which the concept of the independence of agen-
cies with quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative 
powers has prevailed. 
Fein nonetheless argues that if the Supreme 
Court upholds the lower court on Gramm-Rud-
man, the other agencies will be able to carry 
out their functions only if the commissioners 
and governors are for the frrst time subject to 
being dismissed by the president. 
The Federal Reserve System is especially 
vulnerable, in Fein's view. That's because the 
Federal Open Market Committee-the main 
policy-making mechanism of the system-"has 
a majority of persons who aren't even ap-
pointed by the president, much less removable 
(by .the president]." 
He's not quite right: the 12-member FOMC 
is composed of the seven presidentially ap-
pointed reserve board governors and five of 
the 12 presidents of regional Fed banks, se-
lected by those banks. The five presidents (the 
head of the New York Bank and a rotating four 
out of the other 11) constitute an important 
power bloc-and all 12 attend the FOMC 
meetings-but they are not a majority. 
Nonetheless, if the Supreme Court upholds 
the reasoning by which the lower-court panel 
erased the comptroller general from the 
Gramm-Rudman process, we can anticipate 
lawsuits by disgruntled citizens or banks who 
will ask that various decisions of the Fed or 
other agencies be held invalid. If that happens, 
the long-term result could be to dilute or even 
eliminate the exercise of executive powers out-. 
side the president's control. 
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BOWSHER, COMPTJOLLER GEN. OF THE 
UNITED STATES, ET AL.Q~ 
/ v. 
./ 'Ia 
SYNAR, ETC., ET AL.O 
Motion of National Treasury 
Employees Union for leave to 
aad an indi~l party 
~aintiff - "-.. -----
SUMMARY: The National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), a 
plaintiff-appellee in these consolidated appeals, seeks leave to 
add an individual party as a plaintiff. 
BACKGROUND: These cases involve challenges to the Balanced 
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (commonly ·~­
referred to as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act). On February 7, 
1986, a three judge court issued an opinion holding, inter alia, 
that the delegation of certain powers to the Comptroller General 
violates the Constitution's provisions for the separation of 
powers. On February 24, 1986, the Court noted probable 
jurisdiction in these three appeals, ordered the appeals 
,-l fEC~Mifv.L~~ (;.rAr.Jt-
1 
\.,._. o~r N o,t-~ ,ai ~e_ o.AA~ ~ UlV\t{ ve..-
N\~(~l --\<:> ~ ?"r\-le$ Ne~~ --\<:> !on~ '\Vw; 1ssve. 
f 
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consolidated and granted the motion to expedite. The appeals are 
scheduled to be argued on Wednesday, April 23, 1986. 
CONTENTIONS: The NTEU seeks to add Van Riddel of Arlington, 
Texas as an individual party plaintiff. NTEU alleges that he is 
a member of NTEU and has the status of an annuitant under the 
federal civil service retirement laws. The NTEU states that the 
addition of Van Riddel "would alter neither the request for 
relief nor the causes of action alleged." The NTEU seeks to add 
the individual party because the Government recently filed a 
brief in this Court in International Union, United Automobile, 
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, et al. 
v. Brock, No 84-1777, in which the Government challenges the 
doctrine of representational standing. 
The NTEU suggests that the Court granted a similar motion in 
Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 u.s. 415, 416-417 (1952). In Mullaney 
the petr challenged the standing of the resp union for the first 
time in petr's brief to the Court. The NTEU notes that in 
granting resp's motion to add two of its members as parties 
plaintiff, the Court stated: 
To grant the motion merely puts the principal, the real 
party in interest, in the position of his avowed agent. 
The addition of these two parties plaintiff can in no 
wise embarass the defendant. Nor would their earlier 
joinder have in any way affected the course of 
litigation. 
The NTEU further represents that "the granting of the instant 
motion would in no way prejudice any of the parties to this suit, 
all of whom have consented to the filing of this motion, nor 
would an earlier joinder have in any way affected the course of 
the instant litigation." The NTEU admits that its prior 
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identical motion was denied by the DC but explains that result on 
the ground that "the instant appeal had been already docketed by 
this Court" and that the DC "did note the precedent set by 
Mullaney." 
DISCUSSION: This case presents "special circumstances" 
similar to those that supported the motion for leave to add 
parties plaintiff in Mullaney. Accordingly, the Court should 
grant the motion or, in the alternative, defer ac t ion until after 
oral argument. 
First, this case presents a stronger case for efficient 
judicial administration tha~ was present in Mullaney. In 
Mullaney the Court noted that: 
[T]o dismiss the present petition and require the new 
plaintiffs to start over in the District Court would 
entail needless waste and runs counter to effective 
judicial administration-the more so since, with the 
silent concurrence of the defendant, the original 
plaintiffs were deemed proper parties below. 
It is well known that the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act establishes a 
strict timetable for the reduction of the budget. Accordingly, 
this lawsuit was filed as soon after the Act as was possible and 
it has been expedited in both the DC and this Court. A prompt 
decision on the constitutionality of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
Act is clearly in the nation's best interest. A grant of the 
motion will. insure that at least one plaintiff in these cases 
clearly has standing to challenge the provisions of the Act. 
This may be important as the standing of the other plaintiffs 
(members of Congress) has been and remains a strongly contested 
issue. On the other hand, the doctrine of representational 
standing has not been directly raised in this case and, 
f 
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therefore, may be left for consideration in International Union, 
etc. v. Brock, No. 84-1777. 
Second, as in Mullaney, the opposing party did not question 
the union's standing in the lower court. In this case, the 
Government apparently conceded in the DC that NTEU had standing.l 
Finally, the addition of this party plaintiff will not alter 
the request for relief or the causes of action alleged. 
Furthermore, there is no suggestion that an earlier joinder would 
have in any way affected the course of litigation. Although the 
DC denied the NTEU's identical motion, the motion was not made 
until after these appeals ha·d been docketed in this Court. Since 
the motion impacts the status of the litigation in this Court, 
the DC may have denied the motion because it felt that the motion 
should be addressed to this Court. 
Although the motion appears to be in order, the Court has 
not received briefs on the matter from the other parties.2 
Accordingly, if the Court has any questions about the motion, it 
may want to defer action on the motion until after oral argument. 
This has the advantage of not foreclosing any of the Court's 
options. On the other han8., if the Court is satisfied that the 
1 On page six of its ~curiam op1n1on, the three judge court 
notes "[Tlhe United States filed a cross-motion for summary 
judgment, again contending that the complaint of the 
congressional plaintiffs must be dismissed for lack of standing 
but conceding that NTEU appears to have standing." 
2NTEU states that the parties "consented to the filing of this 
motion." It is not clear whether the consent to NTEU filing the 
motion is also a consent to the Court granting the motion. 
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motion should be granted, the deferral of action may cause the 
parties to needlessly brief the motion and the issue of NTEU's 
standing. 
CONCLUSIONS: The motion should be granted because (a) 
NTEU's standing was not challenged below, (b) a grant would be 
consistent with "effective judicial administration" as it would 
remove a potential procedural barrier to the Court reaching the 
merits of the litigation, and (c) the addition of a party 
plaintiff will not alter the causes of action alleged or the 
relief requested. However, if the Court has any questions as to 
the propriety of the motion; it can defer action on the motion 
until after oral argument. 
There is no response. 
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BOWSHER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL 
U.S.SENATE 
O'NEILL, SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE 
v. 
SYNAR, MEMBER OF CONGRESS, ET 
AL. 
STATEMENTS AS TO JURISDICTIONl 
Joint motion to consolidate 
appeals, dispense temporarily 
with printing and to expedite 
consideration 
SUMMARY: The parties ~0 these actions which challenge the 
constitutionality of the 
the Court consolidate the 
, request that 
their 
lrn light of (a)the publicity surrounding the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings Act and these lawsuits challenging the constitutionality 
of the Act and (b) the short period of time between the receipt 
of the jurisdictional statements and joint motion and the 
February 21, 1986 Conference, the jurisdictional statements are 
not discussed beyond the extent necessary for consideration of 
the joint motion. 
0v-G~M ~ o%. 1/V\o+\ f)""> e c.a_ -t-rv --~e Y\3 \ ~ of +\ vw... -C ~ .- t) 0. 
0/\l\q_ 
rP ~.erve... ~ 
0.. 'Cl u li'v\.t.-~ ~ 
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consideration. The parties jointly propose procedures and 
schedules to facilitate expedited consideration. 
BACKGROUND: On December 12, 1985 President Reagan signed 
into law the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 
1985, Pub. L. No. 99, 99 Stat. 1037, popularly known as the 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. Certain Members of Congress and the -
National Treasury Employees Union immediately challenged the 
constitutionality of the Act in the DC for the District of 
Columbia. The United States was the sole named defendant but the 
United States Senate, the Speaker and Bipartisan Leadership Group 
of the United States House of Representatives and the Comptroller 
General of the United States were granted leave to intervene as 
defendants. The cases were consolidated, expedited and presented - ......... 
/ to a three judge court (Circuit Judge Scalia, District Judge 
~Johnson and Senior District Judg~Gasch). 
On February 7, 1986 the court issued a per curiam opinion. 
the Act.2 
2subsection 274(b) of the Act reads: "Notwithstanding any ~~ 
(Footnote continued) 
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The parties did not wait the 30 days allowed by subsection 
274(b) for the filing of jurisdictional statements, rather on 
February 18, 1986, the ComptroJler General (No. 85-1377), the 
United States Senate (No. 85-1378) and the Speaker of the House, 
et al. (No 85-1379), filed their jurisdictional statements. 
Simultaneously, all the parties filed a "joint motion (1) to 
consolidate appeals, (2) to expedite consideration of 
jurisdictional statements, (3) to establish expedited schedule 
for briefing and argument if probable jurisdiction is noted, and 
(4) to permit initial filing of typewritten jurisdictional 
statements and responses and reply briefs." 
CONTENTIONS: The parties initially note that the cases were 
consolidated before the three judge court and the jurisdictional 
~- statements "present a single substantively identical 
constitutional question." The parties suggest that the interests 
of judicial economy will be served by the consolidation of the 
appeals before this Court. 
The parties next request expedition on several grounds. 
First, they note that subsection 274(c) of the Act provides that 
(Footnote 2 continued from previous page) 
other provision of law, any order of the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia which is issued pursuant to an 
action brought under paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (a) 
shall be reviewable by appeal directly to the Supreme Court of 
the United States. Any such appeal shall be taken by a notice of 
appeal filed within 10 days after such order is entered; and the 
jurisdictional statement shall be filed within 30 days after such 
order is entered. No stay of an order issued pursuant to an 
action brought under paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (a) 
shall be issued by a single Justice of the Supreme Court. 
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it is the "duty" of the Supreme Court "to advance on the docket 
and to expedite to the greatest possible extent the disposition" 
of any challenge to the Act. Second, the parties argue that 
expedition would further the interests of all the parties because 
in light of the stay plaintiffs cannot obtain any relief until 
the Court finally disposes of the appeals, and the defendants 
cannot be sure how to proceed as long as the appeals are pending. 
Third, the parties note that while the DC's judgment invalidates 
"both the automatic trigger mechanism under the Act and the first 
use of that mechanism," the stay allowed the first sequestration 
of funds (on February 1, 1986) to take effect. The parties 
suggest that "[T]he propriety and efficacy of this major 
reduction in government spending will remain uncertain until the 
Court completes its consideration of these appeals." Fourth, the 
parties suggest that the "timing of the federal budget cycle 
under the Act provides an especially compelling basis" for 
expedition because reports on the proposed budget deficit are due 
on August 20, 1986 and further action is required by October 1, 
1986. Finally, the parties note that the Court "historically 
expedites cases in circumstances such as these, when expedition 
is required to further national goals of overriding importance." 
Citing Dames and Moore v. Regan, 452 u.s. 932 (1981), Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 213 (1976), and United States v. Nixon, 417 u.s. 
927 (1974). 
To facilitate expedition (assuming probable jurisdiction is 
noted) the parties propose the following briefing schedule. 
Appellants will file their briefs on March 19, 1986. Appellees 
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will file their responsive briefs on April 9, 1986. Appellants' 
reply briefs and "appellees' reply briefs responding solely to 
briefs of other appellees on issues of standing, delegation and 
the role of Congressional Budget Office" will be filed by April 
16, 1986. The additional appellees' reply briefs are requested 
because the United States and the plaintiffs are in conflict on 
several fundamental questions (for example, whether either 
plaintiff has standing to bring the actions). 
The parties request that the Court schedule oral argument 
"on April 23, 1986, or as soon thereafter as the Court's calendar 
permits" and allot two hours for argument. They suggest that ---------------"the significance of the constitutional question presented by the 
appeals and the magnitude of the impact of the resolution of that 
question" merit extended argument. The parties note that the 
Court heard extended argument in Dames and Moore, Buckley, and 
United States v. Nixon. The parties anticipate filing a motion 
at a future time to permit divided argument. 
In order to facilitate expedition, the parties also request 
the following variances from the Court's usual procedures: (1) 
leave to file the joint motion . in typewritten form, (2) "leave to 
file jurisdictional statements and responses initially in 
typewritten form, with printed submissions to follow," (3) "leave 
----------to file appendix to jurisdictional statements initially in 
typewritten form, with printed submission to follow, as part of 
joint appendix if probable jurisdiction is noted, and 
independently if it is not," and (4) leave to file reply briefs 
initially in typewritten form. 
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DISCUSSION: Even without the provisions of subsection 274 
of the Act, it appears that the three judge court's decision is 
properly appealed directly to this Court, and that the Court 
should note probable jurisdiction and expedite plenary 
consideration of the appeals. Since the court held that an Act 
of Congress was, in part, unconstitutional, a, direct app2 al is 
authorized by 28 USC §1252. The reduction of the federal debt is - -----. 
universally conceded to be essential to the welfare of the 
country. Accordingly, the three judge courts' opinion, which 
interferes with the legislative and executive branches' plan for 
reducing the debt, should be expedited to "the greatest extent 
possible" (regardless of the soundness of the three judge courts' 
opinion) . 
I recommend that the parties joint motion be granted in all 
respects ex~t the requ~t that two hours be set aside for oral 
---------·-- -argument. While the appeals may well merit extended argument, it 
is not clear that they require two hours of argument. I suggest 
that the Court reserve its determination of the length of 
argument until the parties file their motion for divided 
argument. At that time, several briefs will have been filed and 
the Court should be in a better position to determine how 
extensive oral argument need be~ · 
In all other respects the parties have tailored their joint 
motion to meet the Court's interests as well as their own. The · 
cases were consolidated below and it is in both the parties' and 
the Court's interest to consolidate the appeals. The proposed 
briefing schedule is tighter than the Court might have imposed 
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and the limited appellees' reply briefs are ' calculated to clarify 
the appellees' conflicting positions. Finally, the submission of 
briefs in typewritten form initially, while more expensive to the ~ 
---·- .\ 
parties, allows for expeditious briefing without the loss of the 
...___---... ---------------benefit of printed briefs. 
CONCLUSIONS: The three judge court's holding that the 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act is in part unconstitutional is clearly 
of such importance that the Court should immediately note 
probable jurisdiction and expedite plenary consideration of the 
appeals. To thjs end, the joint motion should be granted in all 
respects, except the Court might reserve a ruling on the amount 
of time set aside for oral argument until the parties file their 
motion for divided argument. 
2/19/86 Schickele 
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MEMO TO MIKE: 
Bowsher v. Synar 
u.s. Senate v. Synar 
O'Neill v. Synar 
This is the Gramm-Rudman litigation that probably 
will be viewed as the most important case of this Term. 
As appears from the cover page of the SG' s brief, there 
were three separate lawsuits consolidated by the DC. The 
first was by Congressman Mike Synar (joined by eleven 
other Congressmen) , sought a declaratory judgment that the 
Gramm-Rudman Act (the Act) is unconstitutional. The 
United States informed the House and the Senate of its 
view that the role of the Comptroller General under the 
Act is unconstitutional. This prompted the Comptroller 
General, the Senate, and the Speaker and a By-partisan 
Leadership Group of the House, to intervene as defendants 
in support of the constitutionality of the Act. I should 
have noted that in addition to the suit initially filed by 
Congressman Synar, something called the "National Treasury 
Employees Union" also filed a suit seeking to invalidate 
the Act. 
2. 
As I understand the situation, the basic controversy, 
in terms of the parties, is between the Synar group of 
Congressmen, seeking to invalidate the Act, and the 
intervenors named above seeking to sustain the validity of 
the Act. The United States itself apparently is not named 
as a party, and its brief - though not characterized as 
amicus brief supports my understanding of the 
President's position (the Executive Branch), that the 
central provision of the Act vesting unprecedented power 
in the Comptroller General is unconstitutional. 
The three-judge DC, convened pursuant to the Act 
itself, agrees with the United States that the authority 
granted the Comptroller General (see below) - an officer 
of the Legislative Branch - intrudes unconstitutionally on 
the powers of the President. Put simply, the DC found a 
violation of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers. 
The purpose of Gramm-Rudman is to achieve a balanced 
federal budget by 1991 through progressively lower deficit 
targets for the next fiscal years. The Act provides that 
the Comptroller General will issue a report to the 
President and Congress each fiscal year that contains an 
estimate of the size of the deficit, and specifies the 
budget cuts that are necessary in each federal spending 
3. 
account to meet the applicable deficit target. The 
President then is required to sequester federal funds in 
accordance with the Comptroller General's report. 
The Comptroller General, is the head of the General 
Accounting Office (GAO), "an instrumentality of the United 
States Government independent of the Executive 
Departments". He is appointed for a fifteen year term by 
the President, with advice and consent of the Senate, but 
- and this is critical in this case - he is subject to 
removal only by Joint Resolution of Congress. Although 
appointed by the President, this Court has held that the 
Comptroller General is an officer of the Legislative 
Branch whose principle duty is to serve the needs of 
Congress. Bowsher v. Merck & Co. , 460 u.S. 424, 484 
(1983). 
Two other offices that are confusing for me are: the 
Director of the Office of Management & Budget (OMB), and 
the Director of the Congressional Budget Off ice (CBO) . 
The Act requires these two offices to prepare a joint 
report for the Comptroller General that estimates the size 
of the federal deficit for the next fiscal year. After 
the Comptroller General receives the OMB-CBO report, he is 
required by the Act to issue a report to the President and 
~ .. . 
4. 
Congress setting forth his own budget determinations for 
each of the items contained in the OMB-CBO report. The 
Act requires the Comptroller General to undertake and 
"independent analysis", giving due 
recommendations of the OMB and the CBO. 
regard to the 
In any year in which the Comptroller General predicts 
that the deficit will exceed the Act's target by more than 
$10 bill ion, the President "shall issue an order" 
eliminating the full amount of the deficit excess, as 
determined by the Comptroller General. To accomplish that 
purpose, the President's order must sequester all forms of 
federal budget resources "in accordance with" the 
Comptroller General's report and must modify or suspend 
certain automatic spending increases. The President's 
order "must be consistent with" the Comptroller General's 
report "in all respects", and the President "may not 
modify or recalculate any of the estimates, 
determinations, specifications, bases, amounts, or 
percentages". (There are other provisions that need not 
be mentioned here). 
With respect to the fiscal year 1986, the Comptroller 
General issued his report to the President and Congress, 
5. 
and on February 1 the President issued an. order making the 
necessary reductions that totaled $11.7 billion. 
The DC held that the Act is unconstitutional because 
"the powers conferred upon the Comptroller General as part 
of the automatic deficit reduction program are Executive 
Powers, which cannot constitutionally be exercised by an 
officer removable by the Congress". The DC also found 
that the Comptroller General's duties under the Act 
require "interpretation of the law", and the "exercise of 
substantial judgment concerning present and future facts 
that affect the application of the law", both of which are 
powers normally committed initially to the Executive under 
the Constitution's requirement that he "take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed". Article II, Section 3. 
In this memorandum I am relying primarily on the SG's 
brief that is quite well written. I may dictate further 
memoranda as I read additional briefs. It goes without 
saying that the Doctrine of Separation of Powers is a 
central principle of the Constitution. One aspect of this 
doctrine concerns the appointment and removal of the 
"officers of the United States who are charged with 
I 
administering the laws enacted by Congress. The 
Constitution provides that the President shall nominate, 
6. 
with advice and consent of the Senate, the principle 
officers of the government." 
Although the Constitution doesn't expressly provide 
for removal, in Myers v. United States, 272 u.s. 52, 115-
123, this Court held that the power to remove is 
incidental to the power of appointment, as well as a 
necessary aspect of the "Executive Power" vested in the 
President. But Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 
u.s. 602, barred the President from removing a member of 
the Federal Trade Commission except for cause, because of 
the Commission's independence as a "quasi-legislative" and 
"quasi-judicial" body. Humphrey's Executor did not 
question the holding of Myers that Congress may not 
participate (except by impeachment) in the removal of an 
officer of the United States whose is charged with the 
administration of laws. 
The DC accordingly held that §251 of the Gramm-Rduman 
Act is inconsistent with the principle of Separation of 
Powers. The Comptroller General is the central decision 
maker in the administrative implementation of that Act. 
The President and the Executive Departments and agencies 
are subordinated to the Comptroller General. 
I 
7. 
Therefore, the first - and decisive flaw in the Act -
is that the Comptroller General, an officer subject to 
removal by the Congress, is vested with substantial 
authority and control over the Executive Powers of the 
Presidents. The SG identifies a "second fundamental 
constitutional defect". The Comptroller General does not 
serve at the pleasure of the President as he is appointed 
for a 15-year term. Thus, although the Comptroller 
General under this Act takes over certain of the 
President's powers, he cannot be removed by the President. 
But "more is a stake" than a personal right of the 
incumbent to remain in office. In order to preserve the 
Powers, the Comptroller 
performing the duties 






the Separation of 
disqualified from 
him under §251 
provision for Congressional removal, and his status as an 
officer of the Legislative Branch, affect the nature of 
his office. 
It has has been suggested that the 
unconstitutionality of §251 could be removed by "severing" 
the statutory provision for Congressional removal of the 
Comptroller General from office. But the SG says that 
this would not save the Act from unconstitutionality. 
8. 
Before concluding this memorandum, I record for my 
own information that the first full paragraph on p. 13 of 
the SG's brief contains a clear, and understandable, 
summary of why the SG argues that the Act is 
unconstitutional: in addition to Congressional control by 
virtue of its authority to remove the Comptroller, the Act 
vests in that officer powers to make "economic and fiscal 
projections and deficit reduction calculations that are 
binding on the President and the entire Executive Branch." 
Subject to reading other briefs, and also reflecting 
further on the SG's argument, I am tentatively inclined to 
think the DC correctly found the Act to be 
unconstitutional. 
LFP, JR. 
mwm 04/21/86 ~ ~~.eLl.{ 'I/2.J 
-t' lfll.. 9~ ~/.z...-:2-
BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Mike 
No. 85-1377 Bowsher v. Synar 
85-1378 u.s. Senate v. Synar 
85-1379 O'Neill v. Synar 
Date: April 19, 1986 
April 21, 1986 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
,, 
The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 
1985 (the Act) requires the Comptroller General to assess the 
budgetary deficiencies and, pursuant to statutory instructions, 
impose budget cuts. The Comptroller General is appointed by the 
President with the advice and consent of the Senate, and is re-





tion of Congress. Does delegation to the Comptroller General of 
these responsibilities violate the constitutional principle of 
separation-of-powers? 
BACKGROUND 
Congress enacted the Act in December 1985. You are at 
least as well acquainted as I am with the concerns that led to 
the passage of the Act and its consequent importance. The Act is 
intended to achieve a balanced federal budget by 1991 by setting 
deficit "targets" for each year, starting with 1986. The Act 
requires the Director of the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) and the Director of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
to prepare reports estimating the size of the federal deficit: 
the Comptroller General then issues his own independent report to 
the President and to Congress each fiscal year that contains an 
estimate of the size of the deficit and specifies the budget cuts 
that are necessary to meet the deficit target for that year. The 
President then is required to "sequester" federal funds in ac-
cordance with the Comptroller General's report. 
This statutory process has already started for fiscal 
year 1986. The Comptroller General received the joint report of 
the OMB and CBO on January 15, 1986. His report, issued on Janu-
ary 21, 1986, found that the Act requires sequestration of $11.7 
billion this year.l The President issued his sequestration order 
'-= _ ... _ ~ 
on February 1, 1986. It became effective on March 1, 1986. 
1This reminds me of the statement attributed to Senator 
Dirksen: "A billion here, a billion there, pretty soon it starts 
to add up to money! " 
page 3. 
The Comptroller General 
This case turns in large part on the nature of the Office 
of Comptroller General. For that reason, I will briefly give 
some background detail on that officer. 
The First Congress (in 1789) when it created the Treasury 
Dep't also established within Treasury a Comptroller of the 
Treasury, with a wide variety of responsibilities. In~ 
these mixed functions were transferred to a new and independent 
General Accounting Office ("GAO") headed by the Comptroller Gen-
eral. The Comptroller General is appointed by the President, 2 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a term of 15 
years. The Comptroller General is subject to removal by a joint 
resolution of Congress, 31 u.s.c. §703(a) (1), (b), for certain 
- -" _J .. • • ...... .. ~ .~ ~- _. -·~ •• ' t,.K..C.'-"C.., ..,....., ---r,------, ' 
reasons defined in the statute. This congressional power of re-
. ~ 
moval makes the Comptroller General unique among federal off i-
cers, who are generally removable by the President for cause. 
As a factual matter, I do not think there can be any se- ' 
GA-O 
rious dispute about the fact that the GAO is an "independent ~
,4._ L d,;l.• .J.. 
agency." The SG goes to great lengths to try and prove that ~eC G-
Comptroller General/GAO are merely an agency of the Congress. · • 1 c 
.~~<" 
2The SG notes that a l980 §t2tpte authorizes Congress to ~~ 
propose names to the President for appointment as Comptroller 
General, and implies that therefore the Comptroller General is 
not truly an executive officer. SG Br. at 40-41~ Synar Brief at 
47. But Congress in enacting the 1980 law accepted the fact that 
the President had to retain full control over appointments, as 
dictated by this Court's opinion in Buckley v. _Valeo. Therefore, 
under the law, the President is free to select for aEpojntm~t an 
individual whose name is not on the recommended S. Rep. 
No. t d Sess. 1 (19 
page 4. 
Because this is a subsidiary point, I will not go to any great 
lengths to support the flat statement that the SG is wrong. The 
GAO is not different in any material res ect (other than the re-
moval power discussed above) from any other independent agency. 
it is true that the GAO performs some reporting functions 
to Congress, and that the President is required to forward GAO's 
1>-~ budget estimate to Congress without change, the same is true of 
~ other independent agencies, and is consistent with the GAO's sta-
tus as a "watchdog" agency. 
The Relevant Cases 
I will briefly set out the holdings of the relevant cases 
so that I can refer to them by shorthand hereafter. 
v --
A. Myers v. United States, 272 u.s. 52 (1926) involved a postmas-
ter appointed by the President for a four-year term; he was dis-
~ -------
~ missed by the President despite a tenure-of-office act requiring 
·l . I 
f~ the advice and consent of the Senate for his removal. The Court, 
'~~in an opinion by Chief Justi~~ - Taft, held that for Congress to 
~ "~ to itself ••. the power to remove or the right to partic-
~~pate in the exercise of that power [would bel to infringe the 
V';; W consti tutional principle of the separation of governmental pow-
~ers.: Id., at 161. The holding in Myers is also partly based on 
wlt:J ~ea expressed by Congress in 1789 and by earlier Court opin-
y'l s that t~ power of removal is incident to the power of ~-
~ pointment. 
B. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 u.s. 602 (1935) was 
a suit for back pay by a commissioner of the Federal Trade Com-----...... 
mission whom FDR had fired without cau~e. The FTC Act provided 
that the commissioners "may be removed by the President - - .. 






upheld this Congressional limitation on the President's removal ~"'-?'--. 
powers. . 
"purely executive officers" and that it did not apply to an offi_.;;~ ... 
'-'~ 
cer like the FTC commissioner, who was independent of the execu-
- · -
tive. The holding in Humphrey's Executor facilitated the growth 
of the so-called independent agencies like the FTC, the Federal 
Reserve, and the Comptroller General. (j;f..._t.._.3. ~ k ~j 
c. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 u.s. 1 (1975) involved a constitutional 
challenge to the establishment of the Federal Election Commis-
sion. The Court, inter alia, held that the Commission could not 
exercise the powers of Officers of the United States because they 
were appointed by Congress. The Appointments Clause, Art. II, 
§2, cl. 2, vests in the President the power to appoint all Offi-
cers- of the Uni~tates. 
D. INS v. Chadha, 462 u.s. 919 (1983) involved a challenge to the 
one-house veto. Although its actual holding is not strictly rel-
evant to this case, much of its reasoning regarding separation-
of-po~ers is pertinent. 
DISCUSSION 
1. Standing 
This case presents some difficult issues of congressional 
~and representational standing. One of the plaintiffs, an indi-
,rl/ 
~vidual member of the National Treasury Employees Union,~early 
~has standing to raise all the issue presented by this case; in .. 
~r~ct, his standing appears to be unopposed. I therefore recom-
/ 
page 6. 
mend that you follow the SG's suggestion, SG Br. 12, n. 9, and 
defer cons'deration of the congressional nd associational stand-
in~ issues for full brief~~ aEd _aJE~nt in the cases listed by 
the SG. 
2. Delegation of Congressional Power 
There is some argument that the Act represents an 
overbroad delegation of power by Congress to an agency. The DC 
rejected this argument. It referred to the detailed descriptions 
in the Act of the statistical presumptions that are binding on 
the Comptroller General, and of the explicit instructions con-
cerning which programs to cut and how. The Act does not delegate 
even as much discretion and legislative judgment to an agency as 
other Acts that previously have been upheld. I conclude tha.t 
there is no violation here of the nondelegation doctrine. 
~:n::::ressional Retention of Removal Power over the Comptroller 
~ The principal issue in this case revolves around the fact 
that Congress has the power to remove the Comptroller General. 
The arguments take various forms. I think they can be distilled 
into two basic arguments. ---- Because these arguments are so inter- ~~~ twined, I will present the substance of the argument before any~~~·~ 
--' 
discussion. 
Argument One: Congress' assertion of the power to remove 
the Comptroller General is an unconstitutional infringement on 
the President's power of removal. 
This argument involves the extent to which Congress, act-
ing in its legislative capacity, may specify the standards and 
page 7. 
procedures that will govern the President in exercising the power 
to remove federal officers. It focuses on Myers and Humphrey's 
Executor, reading the former broadly and the latter narrowly. 
Myers reasoned that because the Constitution granted the Presi-
dent the right to appoint all "Officers of the United States," it 
impliedly granted him some power of removal over those same Offi-
cers. Congress, therefore, can at most only incidentally regu-
late or define the President's power of removal. Humphrey's Ex-
ecutor is read as defining the vt ry limit of Congress' ability to 
infringe the President's removal power: Congress can 1 imi t the 
I' 
President to removal for cause with respect to "independent agen---- ....... 
cies" that operate outside the direct control of the President. 
T~ 
Argument ~e: The Constitution prohibits Congress from 
retaining for 
II ~\ 
itself control over the execution of a law after 
its enactment by granting itself the power of removal over the ---------------- - -- .... 
executive officer entrusted with the administration of the law. 
Sl \~ 
The focus of this argument is the r~s. The 
argument examines the extent to which Congress may inject itself 
into the administration of a law after its enactment. The cen-
tral point of the argument is that Congress may not delegate the 
task of carrying out a law that it has passed to federal officers 
who are responsible to Congress. This argument reads Myers as a 
limitation on Congress' authority to inject itself in any way 
into the removal process. Humphrey's Executor is read as a repu-
diation of dicta in Myers to the effect that Congress could not 
place limitations on the President's removal power. In other 
words, while Congress may well have authority to limit the Presi-
page 8. 
dent's removal power, it may not take to itself any removal pow-
er. 
The DC opinion merged these two arguments. While they 
~---------------------,--------~-----------------
seem very similar, it is very important to separate them out. -
Argument One would require the Court to cast doubt on Congress' 
ability to create independent agencies. Particularly in the last 
half-century, Congress has perceived a need to assign some tasks 
that are executive in nature to agencies or officers that are 
insulated to some extent from political influence or control. 
The recent--and much-needed--independence of Chairman Volker is 
only the latest example of tasks that may be better performed by 
independent officers or agencies. One of the principal means 
used by Congress to insulate these officers from political con-
cerns is to limit the President's power of removal. Instead of 
serving at the pleasure of the President, these officers are usu----------·· ----------
ally appointed for a term of years and may only be removeq for ----------
cause. -- ------ -The constitutional defect of the Act, then, is not that - -
Congress has imposed any limit on the President's right of remov-
al. Congress can assign executive tasks to officers that are to -
some degree insulated from political removal by the President. 
w7:;.:f 
.:==- '-"'1....1 What the Constitution forbids is for Congress to enact a law, and ~ · 
then ret;_iiJ_e~t!'k: ~r ~hec=,i !!!glementi~g _;> ffic~:. That is ~-
~~"" 
what happened, to a lesser degree, in Myers. The statute in MY-
ers provided for the removal of postmasters by the President 
"with the advice and consent of the Senate." 272 u.s., at 107. 
The actual holding in Myers is that Congress may not retain any 
page 9. 
substantive control over those who are assigned to execute the 
laws. There is broad dicta in Myers to the effect that Congress 
may not impose any limits on the President's removal power, but 
that dicta was specifically discredited in Humphrey's Executor, 
which involved almost an identical statute. The Constitutional 
principle that remains after these two cases is that Congress is 
free (to an undetermined extent) to limit the President's removal --po~r over independent officers or agencies. But is prohibited -- --
from retaining any removal power itself over those same officers • 
._.,,.......,_.. -~ h.........,_, ............... ~twa• .,., 
The SG makes a slight variation of Argument Two. He con-
tends that congressional retention of the power to remove the 
Comptroller General, along with other factors, indicates that the 
Comptroller General is not truly an independent agency, but rath-
er an agent of Congress. This argument would have great merit 
if, and only if, Congress actually were delegating the execution 
of the Act to an agent or committee of Congress. But, as I ex-
plained earlier, the Comptroller General cannot fairly be charac-
ter ized as an agent of Congress. The Comptroller General--and ·--..-; 
the o!!J~s, t~AO--fi: into the category of in-
dependent agencies. The reason the SG characterizes the argument ____________... 
in this way, I believe, is that it impliedly makes the argument 
that Congress cannot limit the President's removal power. Both 
the SG and the DC would read Myers to create such a rule, and 
would have the Court either strictly limit Humphrey's Executor 
(to agencies that perform "quasi-judicial" or "quasi-legislative" 
functions) or altogether reconsider the opinion. I do not read 
those cases in the same way. ··- ------- But perhaps the more prudent 
page 10. 
course, given the importance of these principles and their infre-
quent review in this Court, is simply to state that this case 
does not present the question of Congress' authority to limit the 
'l ' t'-President's removal power, because whatever those 1 imi ts might 
~ J( 
be, Congress cannot retain any removal power itself over those 
~----------~ 
who execute the laws . .._______.. 
4. Severability: Rather than engage in any extended discussion, 
L • 
let me just say that I conclude that the fallback provision of 
the Act indicates that Congress intended that the grant of au-
thority to the Comptroller General be severed from the rest of 
the Act. The Comptroller General argues that the Court must look 
to the intent of the 1921 Congress in order to determine the rel-_____.. 
evant intent. But since that time, Congress has added to. the ----.. --duties of the Comptroller General many, many times. It would be ---- ---
very difficult to track down and determine in each of those in-
stances whether Congress would prefer that the substantive grant 
7 
of power be withdrawn, or that Congress' removal power over the 
Comptroller General be withdrawn. The much simpler, and more~ 
'
defensible approach, is to allow the fallback provision contained '---
in the very Act at issue here to come into play. ----------
CONCLUSION 
I recommend affirming the DC, but for the reasons stated / 
here: Congress cannot retain to itself any power of removal over 
----------------~---
Executive Officers or their agencies, including those usually 
styled "independent agencies." 
T~~ J/u,.c.crs '¥!z.J 
g-ti"- l~?? 8~V'. '51-I'U~ , ,r. 
--.~ ;, r~ c.~.c;~L--(_(cc;:.)'lA.)~~~~~~u.s, 
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To: Justice Powell 
From: Mike 
Re: 11 Gramm-Rudman 11 Nos. 85-1377, 1378, 1379 
Date: April 24, 1986 
My final recommendation is that it violates separation of 
powers principles for Congress to grant itself removal power over 
an officer entrusted with the execution of a law. You asked 
which case provided the most direct support for that proposition. 
In fairness, no case provides 11 direct 11 support for that 
proposition. Like most separation of powers questions, the 
answer depends to some extent on abstract reasoning and secondary 
sources such as The Federalist Papers. The cases do support, 
however, a more general proposition that includes the narrower 
proposition I recommend. In INS v. Chadha, 462 u.s. 919 (1983), 
the Court recognized the fundamental principle that the 
11 Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new 
Federal Government into three defined categories, Legislative, 
Executive, and Judicial, to assure, as nearly as possible, that 
each branch of government would confine itself to its assigned 
responsibility ... Id., at 951. The point of this principle is 
that when Congress enacts a law, its authority with regard tq ~ 
~~-.!I, s; 3 ·~ 
that law is at an end: the Constitution entrusts the ~sotment of 
~ ~ 
such laws only to the Executive, through his appointed 11 officers 
~!I J z 
of the United States... 11 Congress must abide by its delegation of 
1 
authority until that delegation is legislatively altered or 
revoked ... Id., at 955. Congress has delegated the execution of 
',J t 
the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act to the 
C<2_rnpt_Ioll~al; it has no authority to exercise any control 
'-........_.. 
over the implementation of that Act. My recommendation sterns 
from that general proposition: I reason that Congress' power to 
r~e the Comptroller General is a form of control over the 
implementation of the Act. As we discussed, the ultimate 
question is whether the bare existence of a statutory power to 
__.., 
remove the Comptroller General for specified reasons (e.g., 
inefficiency) actually does amount to a form of congressional 
control over the implementation and execution of a duly enacted 
law. 
Lloyd Cutler's argument is a practical one. He contends 
that the Comptroller General has no real need to feel any 
subservience to Congress. In the 65 years that Congress has had 
removal power over the Comptroller General, it has never even 
threatened to use it, even during times of momentary 
disagreement. In addition, the Comptroller General is appointed 
by the President, and naturally feels some loyalty to the one who 
gave him the job. Finally, if Congress attempted to remove the 
Comptroller General for political reasons, it would have to 
justify its actions in terms of the statutory list of reasons for 
removal, which is fairly narrow. It also would have to pass a 
joint resolution of Congress in order to remove him. If the 
President vetoes the joint resolution, Congress would have to 
override the veto with a two-thirds majority. In practical 
terms, then, the Comptroller General has nothing to fear from 
Congress. 
The argument on the other side is that if Congress is 
allowed to enact a constitutionally infirm removal provision over 
executive officers, and if such provisions will not be 
invalidated by this Court until they are actuall used, a serious 
constitutional unbalance could take place without any judicial 
review. If the existence of Congress' removal power does result 
in some subservience to Congress, then actual removal never will 
be necessary. In that manner, Congress can obtain the 
unconstitutional power it desires without ever triggering this 
Court's review. Rather than risk such a situation, the Court _______, 
should draw a bright line that forbids Congress from even 
attempting to take to itself a power that the Constitution 
forbids it to have. "[T)he fact that a given law or procedure is 
efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of 
government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to 
the Constitution." Chadha, 462 u.s., at 944. "It may seem odd 
that this curtailment of such an important and hard-fought 
legislative program should hinge upon the relative technicality 
of authority over the Comptroller General ••• But the balance of 
separated powers established by the Constitution consists 
precisely of a series of technical provisions that are more 
important to liberty than superficially appears, and whose 
observance cannot be approved or rejected by the courts as the 
times seem to require." Svnar v. United States, slip op. at 49 
(D.D.C. 1985). 
As I expressed to you earlier, I have not been able to 
come to rest between the two arguments expressed above. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES C ~ ~ 
Nos. 85-1377, 85-1378 AND 85- 1379 s-/3 
CHARLES A. BOWSHER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL 
OF THE UNITED STATES, APPELLANT 
85-1377 v. 
MIKE SYNAR, MEMBER OF 
CONGRESS, ET AL. 
UNITED STATES SENATE, APPELLANT 
85-1378 v. 
MIKE SYNAR, MEMBER OF 
CONGRESS, ET AL. 
THOMAS P. O'NEILL, JR., SPEAKER OF THE UNITED 
STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
85-1379 
ET AL., APPELLANTS 
v. 
MIKE SYNAR, MEMBER OF 
CONGRESS, ET AL. 
ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
[June-, 1986] 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
The question presented on this appeal is whether the 
assignment by Congress to the Comptroller General of the 
United States of certain functions under the Balanced Budget 
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 violates the doc-
trine of separation of powers. 
: 
2 
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I 
A 
On December 12, 1985, the President signed into law the 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, 
Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037, popularly known as the 
"Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act." The purpose of the Act is 
to eliminate the federal budget deficit. To that end, the Act 
sets a "maximum deficit amount" for federal spending for 
each of fiscal years 1986 through 1991. The size of that max-
imum deficit amount progressively reduces to zero in fiscal 
year 1991. · If in any fiscal year the federal budget deficit ex-
ceeds the maximum deficit amount by more than a specified 
sum, the Act requires across-the-board cuts in federal spend-
ing to reach the targeted deficit level, with half of the cuts 
made in defense programs and the other half made to non-
defense programs. The Act exempts certain priority pro-
grams from these cuts. § 255. 
These "automatic" reductions are accomplished through a 
rather complicated procedure, spelled out in § 251, the so-
called "reporting provisions" of the Act. Each year, the 
Directors of the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") 
and the Congressional Budget Office ("CBO") independently 
estimate the amount of the federal budget deficit for the 
upcoming fiscal year. If that deficit exceeds the maximum 
targetted deficit amount for that fiscal year by more than a 
specified amount, the Directors of OMB and CBO independ-
ently calculate, on a program-by-program basis, the budget 
reductions necessary to ensure that the deficit does not ex-
ceed the maximum deficit amount. The Act then requires 
the Directors to report jointly their deficit estimates and 
budget reduction calculations to the Comptroller General. 
The Comptroller General, after reviewing the Directors' 
reports, then reports his conclusions to the President. 
§ 251(b). The President in turn must issue a "sequestration" 
order mandating the spending reductions specified by the 
Comptroller General. § 252. There follows a period during 
85-1377, 85-1378 & 85-1379--0PINION 
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which Congress may by legislation reduce spending to obvi-
ate, in whole or in part, the need for the sequestration order. 
If such reductions are not enacted, the sequestration order 
becomes effective and the spending reductions included in 
that order are made. 
Anticipating constitutional challenge to these procedures, 
the Act also contains a "fallback" deficit reduction process to 
take effect "[i]n the event that any of the reporting proce-
dures described in § 251 are invalidated." § 274(f). Under 
these provisions, the report prepared by the Directors of 
OMB and the CBO is submitted directly to a specially-cre-
ated Temporary Joint Committee on Deficit Reduction, 
which must report in five days to both Houses a joint resolu-
tion setting forth the content of the Directors' report. Con-
gress then must vote on the resolution under special rules, 
which render amendments out of order. If the resolution is 
passed and signed by the President, it then serves as the 
basis for a Presidential sequestration order. 
B 
Within hours of the President's signing of the Act, 1 
Congressman Synar, who had voted against the Act, filed a 
complaint seeking declaratory relief that the Act was uncon-
stitutional. Eleven other Members later joined Congress-
man Synar's suit. A virtually identical lawsuit was also filed 
by the National Treasury Employees Union. The Union 
alleged that its members had been injured as a result of the 
Act's automatic spending reduction provisions, which have 
suspended certain cost-of-living benefit increases to the 
Union's members. 2 
1 In his signing statement, the President expressed his view that the Act 
was constitutionally defective because of the Comptroller General's ability 
to exercise supervisory authority over the President. Statement on Sign-
ing H. J . Res. 372 Into Law, 21 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 1491 (1985). 
2 An individual member of the Union was later added as a plaintiff. See 
Journal OT '85, p. 502. 
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A three-judge District Court, appointed pursuant to 2 
U. S. C. § 922(a)(5), invalidated the reporting provisions. 
Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D DC 1986) 
(Scalia, Johnson, Gasch, JJ.). The District Court concluded 
that the Union had standing to challenge the Act since the 
members of the Union had suffered actual injury by suspen-
sion of certain benefit increases. The District Court also 
concluded that Congressman Synar and his fellow Members 
had standing under the so-called "Congressional standing" 
doctrine. See, Barnes v. Kline, 759 F. 2d 21, 41 (CADC 
1985), cert. granted, No. 85-781 (March 3, 1986). 
The District Court next rejected appellees' challenge that 
the Act violated the delegation doctrine. The court ex-
pressed no doubt that the Act delegated broad authority, but 
delegation of similarly broad authority has been upheld in 
past cases. The District Court observed that in Y akus v. 
United States, 321 U. S. 414, 420 (1944) this Court upheld a 
statute that delegated to an unelected "Price Administrator" 
the power "to promulgate regulations fixing prices of com-
modities." Moreover, in the District Court's view, the Act 
adequately confined the exercise of administrative discretion. 
The District Court concluded that "the totality of the Act's 
standards, definitions, context, and reference to past admin-
istrative practice provides an adequate 'intelligible principle' 
to guide and confine administrative decisionmaking." 626 F. 
Supp., at 1389. 
Although the District Court concluded that the Act sur-
vived a delegation doctrine challenge, it held that the role of 
the Comptroller General in the deficit reduction process 
violated the separation of powers doctrine. The court first 
explained that the Comptroller General exercises executive 
functions under the Act. However, the Comptroller Gen-
eral, while appointed by the President with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, is removable not by the President but 
only by a Congressional joint resolution or by impeachment. 
The District Court reasoned that this arrangement could not 
85-1377, 85-1378 & 85-1379-0PINION 
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be sustained under this Court's decisions in Myers v. United 
States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), and Humphrey's Executor v. 
United States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935). Under the separation 
of powers established by the Framers of the Constitution, 
the court concluded, Congress may not retain the power of 
removal over an officer performing executive functions. The 
Congressional removal power created a "here-and-now sub-
servience" of the Comptroller General to Congress. 602 F. 
Supp., at 1392. The District Court therefore held that 
"since the powers conferred upon the Comptroller Gen-
eral as part of the automatic deficit reduction process are 
executive powers, which cannot constitutionally be exer-
cised by an officer removable by Congress, those powers 
cannot be exercised and therefore the automatic deficit 
reduction process to which they are are central cannot be 
implemented." 
/d., at 1403. 
Appeals were taken directly to this Court pursuant to 
§ 274(b) of the Act. We noted probable jurisdiction and ex-
pedited consideration of the appeals. 475 U. S. -- (1986). 
We affirm. 
II 
A threshold issue is whether the Members of Congress, 
members of the National Treasury Employees Union, or the 
Union itself have standing to challenge the constitutionality 
of the Act in question. It is clear that members of the 
Union, one of whom is an appellee here, will sustain injury 
by not receiving a scheduled increase in benefits. See 
§ 252(a)(6)(C)(i); 602 F. Supp., at 1381. This is sufficient to 
confer standing under § 27 4(a)(2) and Article III. We there-
fore need not consider the standing issue as to the Union or 
Members of Congress. See Secretary of the Interior v. Cali-
fornia, 464 U. S. 312, 319 n. 3 (1984). Cf. International 
Union, UAW v. Brock, -- U.S. -- (1986); Burke v. 
; 
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Barnes, supra. Accordingly, we turn to the merits of the 
case. 
III 
We noted recently that "[t]he Constitution sought to divide 
the delegated powers of the new Federal Government into 
three defined categories, Legislative, Executive, and Judi-
cial." INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 951 (1983). The 
declared purpose of separating and dividing the powers of 
government, of course, was to "diffuse power the better to 
secure liberty." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
343 U. S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice 
Jackson's words echo the famous warning of Montesquieu, 
quoted by James Madison in The Federalist No. 47, that 
"'there can be no liberty where the legislative and executive 
powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates 
. . . . "' The Federalist No. 47, p. 325 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
Even a cursory examination of the Constitution reveals the 
influence of Montesquieu's thesis that checks and balances 
were the foundation of a structure of government that would 
protect liberty. The Framers provided a vigorous legisla-
tive branch and a separate and wholly independent executive 
branch, with each branch responsible ultimately to the peo-
ple. The Framers also provided for a judicial branch equally 
independent with "[t]he judicial Power ... extend[ing] to all 
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution 
and the laws of the United States." Art. III, § 2. 
Other, more subtle, examples of separated powers are evi-
dent as well. Unlike parliamentary systems such as that of 
Great Britain, no person who is an officer of the United 
States may serve as a Member of the Congress. Art. I, § 6. 
Moreover, unlike parliamentary systems, the President, 
under Article II, is responsible not to the Congress but to the 
people, subject only to impeachment proceedings which are 
exercised by the two Houses as representatives of the peo-
ple. Art. II, § 4. And even in the impeachment of a Presi-
dent the presiding officer of the ultimate tribunal is not a 
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BOWSHER v. SYNAR 7 
member of the legislative branch, but the Chief Justice of the 
United States. Art I, § 2. 
That this system of division and separation of powers is 
productive of conflicts, confusion, and discordance at times is 
inherent, but it was deliberately so structured to assure full, 
vigorous and open debate on the great issues affecting the 
people and to provide avenues for the operation of checks on 
the exercise of governmental power. · 
The Constitution does not contemplate that the President 
alone will "faithfully execute" the laws. Article II, § 2 pro-
vides that the President 
"shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Con-
sent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other 
public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme 
Court, and all other Officers of the United States ... 
which shall be established by Law; but the Congress 
may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Offi-
cers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the 
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." 
The Constitution does not expressly refer to removal of Offi-
cers of the United States, other than in the impeachment pro-
vision, article II, § 4. Undoubtedly, however, the draftsmen 
of the Constitution recognized that a President could not ful-
fill his Constitutional duties without the power to remove any 
of his officers who failed to execute his policies faithfully. 
The commissions issued to many of the major executive offi-
cers have recited that the holder serves "during the pleasure 
of the President." 
The President's removal power was a subject of debate in 
the First Congress in 1789. Congress considered an amend-
ment to a bill establishing the Department of Foreign Affairs; 
the bill as then drafted provided that the Secretary of For-
eign Affairs was "to be removable from the office by the 
President." James Madison, among others, urged the dele-
tion of those words because "these words carry with them an 
implication that the Legislature has the power of granting 
85-1377, 85-1378 & 85-1379-0PINION 
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the power of removal." 1 Annals of Gong. 581 (1789). Mad-
ison argued: 
"If there is any point in which the separation of the Leg-
islative and Executive powers ought to be maintained 
with greater caution, it is that which relates to the offi-
cers and offices .... The Legislature creates the offices, 
defines the powers, limits its duration, and annexes a 
compensation. This done, the Legislative Power 
ceases." 
Id., at 581-582. See generally Myers, supra, 272 U. S., at 
111-136. The amendment was agreed to, and 
"there is not the slightest doubt, after an examination of 
the record, that the vote was, and was intended to be, a 
legislative declaration that the power to remove officers 
appointed by the President and the Senate vested in the 
President alone . . . . " 
Myers, supra, 272 U. S., at 114. 
Such a declaration from "the first Congress assembled under 
the Constitution, many of whose members had taken part in 
framing that instrument, . . . is contemporaneous and 
weighty evidence of its true meaning."' Marsh v. Cham-
bers, 463 U. S. 783, 790 (1983). 3 
3 The First Congress included 17 members who had been delegates to 
the Philadelphia Convention: 
IN THE SENATE 
Richard Bassett (Delaware) 
Pierce Butler (South Carolina) 
William Few (Georgia) 
William Samuel Johnson 
(Connecticut) 
John Langdon (New Hampshire) 
Robert Morris (Pennsylvania) 
William Paterson (New Jersey) 
George Read (Delaware) 
Rufus King (New York) 
IN THE HOUSE 
Abraham Baldwin (Georgia) 
Daniel Carroll (Maryland) 
George Clymer (Pennsylvania) 
Thomas FitzSimmons (Pennsylvania) 
Nicholas Gilman (New Hampshire) 
James Madison (Virginia) 
Roger Sherman (Connecticut) 
Hugh Williamson (North Carolina) 
85-1377, 85-1378 & 85-1379-0PINION 
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The Court revisited this subject in Myers v. United States, 
272 U. S. 52 (1925). In Myers, this Court emphatically reaf-
firmed the sole power of a President to remove his officers 
even though their initial appointment was subject to the ap-
proval of the Senate. The statute at issue in Myers provided 
that certain postmasters could be removed only "by and with 
the consent of the Senate," and that provision was held un-
constitutional as impinging on Executive authority. 
In Myers, Chief Justice Taft, writing for the Court, ac-
knowledged the obvious practical reality that 
"the President alone and unaided could not execute the 
laws. He must execute them by the assistance of subor-
dinates. This view has since been repeatedly affirmed 
by this Court. Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Peters 498, 513; 
United States v. Eliason, 16 Peters 291, 302; Williams 
v. United States, 1 How. 290, 297; Cunningham v. 
Neagle, 135 U. S. 1, 63; Russell v. United States, 261 
U. S. 514, 523. As he is charged specifically to take 
care care that they are faithfully executed, the reason-
able implication, even in the absence of express words, 
was that as part of his executive power he should select 
those who were to act for him under his direction in the 
execution of the laws." 
272 U. S., at 117-118. 
The Court further held that 
"Article II grants to the President the executive power 
of the Government, i. e., the general administrative con-
trol of those executing the laws, including the power of 
appointment and removal of executive officers-a con-
clusion confirmed by his obligation to take care that the 
laws be faithfully executed; ... to hold otherwise would 
make it impossible for the President, in case of political 
or other differences with the Senate or Congress, to take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed." 
272 U. S., at 163-164. 
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The holding in Humphrey's Executors v. United States, 
295 U. S. 602 (1935), is wholly consistent with the Court's 
holding in Myers, and the Humphrey's Executors Court took 
pains to distinguish the Myers decision. See 295 U. S., at 
627. 4 Justice Sutherland, speaking for a unanimous Court, 
also underscored the crucial role of separated powers in our 
system: 
"The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the 
three general departments of government entirely free 
from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, 
of either of the others, has often been stressed and is 
hardly open to serious question. So much is implied in 
the very fact of the separation of the powers of these 
departments by the Constitution; and in the rule which 
recognizes their essential co-equality. The sound appli-
cation of a principle that makes one master in his own 
house precludes him from imposing his control in the 
house of another who is master there." 
295 U. S., at 629-630. 
Only recently this Court reaffirmed the teaching of Myers 
that the President has "supervisory and policy responsibil-
ities of the utmost discretion and sensitivity ... and manage-
ment of the Executive Branch-a task for which 'imperative' 
reasons requir[e] an unrestricted [Presidential] power to re-
move the most important of his subordinates .... " Nixon 
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731, 749, 750 (1982) (quoting Myers, 
supra, 272 U. S., at 134-135). 
Thus, from 1789 to the present, it has been recognized that 
the President's authority to direct his subordinates is en-
'The instant case is also distinguishable from Humphrey's Executors, 
which involved restrictions on the President's power to remove an officer 
the Court found to be "wholly disconnected from the executive depart-
ment." 295 U. S., at 630. In contrast, the present case presents no ques-
tions involving restrictions of the President's power of removal. It is un-
disputed that the Comptroller General is removable not by the President, 
but only by Congress. 
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forced through the power of removal. Given the vast 
growth of government, the authority of the President today 
to remove an officer of the Executive Branch appointed by 
him is even more crucial to the management of the govern-
ment and execution of the laws than it was at the inception of 
the government when that authority was defined by the first 
Congress in 1789. A modern President must depend upon 
liter·ally thousands of subordinates to give effect to the Presi-
dent's policies with fidelity. A subordinate of the Executive 
Branch who fails because of incompetence or want of experi-
ence-or is in disagreement with a President's policy-must 
be subject to replacement promptly if a President's policies 
are to be given effect. In no other way can the affairs of a 
complex, modern government of divided power be conducted. 
Just as Members of the House and Senate must have staffs 
who will faithfully carry out the policies of that Member, a 
President can have no less. 
Under our system of separated powers, then, because the 
power of removal over Executive Branch officers resides in 
the President, Congress may not retain the sole power of re-
moval of an officer charged with the execution of the laws. 
To do so would directly intrude on the President's obligations 
to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Art. 
II, § 3. The Constitution grants Congress "[a]ll legislative 
Powers," Art. I, § 1, but the enforcement of the laws Con-
gress enacts is left to the President. To permit the execu-
tion of the laws to be vested in an officer answerable only to 
Congress would, in practical terms, allow Congress to retain 
control over the execution of the laws. This is precisely the 
type of aggrandizement by one branch of Government that 
our Constitutional scheme was designed to prevent. With 
these principles in mind, we turn to consideration of the 
nature of the office of the Comptroller General. 
IV 
The Comptroller General heads the General Accounting 
'. 
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Office, "an instrumentality of the United States Government 
independent of the executive departments," 31 U. S. C. 
§ 702(a), which was created by Congress in 1921 as part of the 
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, 43 Stat. 23. Congress 
created the office because it believed that it "needed an offi-
cer responsible to it alone, to check upon the application of 
public funds in accordance with appropriations." H. Mans-
field, The Comptroller General: A Study in the Law and 
Practice of Financial Administration 65 (1939). 
It is clear that Congress has consistently viewed the 
Comptroller General as an officer of the Legislative Branch. 
The Reorganization Acts of 1945 and 1949, for example, both 
stated that the Comptroller General and the GAO are "a part 
of the legislative branch of Government." 59 Stat. 616; 63 
Stat. 205. Similarly, in the Accounting and Audit Act of 
1950, Congress required the Comptroller General to conduct 
audits "as an agent of the Congress." 64 Stat. 835. 
Over the years, the Comptroller General's have also 
viewed themselves as part of the Legislative Branch. In one 
of the early Annual Reports of Comptroller General, the offi-
cial seal of his office was described as reflecting: 
"the independence of judgment to be exercised by the 
General Accounting Office, subject to the control of the 
legislative branch . . . . The combination represents an 
agency of the Congress independent of other authority 
auditing and checking the expenditures of Government 
as required by law and subjecting any questions arising 
in that connection to quasi-judicial determination." 
Annual Report of the General Accounting Office, 1924, 
pp. 5-6. 
Comptroller General Warren later testified that: "During 
most of my public life, ... I have been a member of the 
Legislative Branch. Even now, although heading a great 
agency, it is an agency of the Congress, and I am an agent of 
Congress." To Provide for the Reorganization of Agencies 
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of the Government: Hearings on H. R. 3325 Before the House 
Comm. on Expenditures, 79th Gong., 1st Sess. 69 (1945) 
(emphasis added). And, in one conflict during Comptroller 
General McCarl's tenure, he asserted his independence of the 
Executive Branch, stating: 
"Congress . . . is . . . the only authority to which there 
lies an appeal from the decision of this office. . . . I may 
not accept the opinion of any official, inclusive of the At-
torney General, as controlling my duty under the law." 
2 Comp. Gen. 784 (1923) (disregarding conclusion of the 
Attorney General, 33 Ops. Att'y Gen. 476 (1923) with re-
spect to interpretation of compensation statute). 
That the role and functions of the Office of Comptroller 
General of the United States have long been identified with 
the legislative branch in popular and political perception is, of 
course, not dispositive. The critical aspects lie in the statute 
defining the Comptroller General's office. The Comptroller 
General, is nominated by the President from a list of three 
individuals recommended by the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Sen-
ate, see 31 U. S. C. §703(a)(2), and confirmed by the Senate. 
The Comptroller General is, however, not removable by the 
President but only by Congress itself. He may be removed 
"at any time" by a Joint Resolution of Congress resting on 
any one of the following bases: 
(i) permanent disability; (ii) inefficiency; (iii) neglect of 
duty; (iv) malfeasance; or (v) a felony or conduct involv-
ing moral turpitude." 
31 U. S. C. § 703(e)(l) (1982). 5 
' We reject appellants argument that consideration of the effect of a 
removal provision is not "ripe" until that provision is actually used. As 
the District Court concluded, "it is the Comptroller General's presumed de-
sire to avoid removal by pleasing Congress ... which creates the here-
and-now subservience to another branch that raises separation-of-powers 
problems." 602 F . Supp., at 1392. 
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This prov1s10n was included, as one Congressman ex-
plained in urging passage of the Act, because Congress "felt 
that [the Comptroller General] should be brought under the 
sole control of Congress, so that Congress at the moment 
when it found he was inefficient and was not carrying on the 
duties of his office as he should and as the Congress expected, 
could remove him without the long, tedious process of a trial 
by impeachment." 61 Gong. Rec. 1081 (1921) (Rep. Byrns). 
Thus, we see no escape from the conclusion that, because 
Congress has retained sole removal authority over the Comp-
troller General, he is not an officer of the Executive Branch. 
Accordingly, Myers dictates that the Comptroller General 
may not be entrusted with executive powers. We must 
therefore determine whether the Comptroller General has 
been assigned such powers in the Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. 
v 
The primary responsibility of the Comptroller General 
under the instant Act is the preparation a "report." This 
report must contain detailed estimates of projected federal 
revenues and expenditures. The report must also specify 
the reductions, if any, necessary to reduce the deficit to the 
target for the appropriate fiscal year. The reductions must 
be set forth on a program-by-program basis. 
In preparing the report, the Comptroller General is to 
have "due regard" for the estimates and reductions set forth 
in a joint report submitted to him by the Director of CBO and 
the Director of OMB, the President's fiscal and budgetary 
expert. However, the Act plainly contemplates that the 
Comptroller General will exercise his independent judgment 
and evaluation with respect to those estimates. The Act 
also provides that the Comptroller General's report "shall 
explain fully any differences between the contents of such re-
port and the report of the Directors." § 251(b)(2)(B). 
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It is clear that these functions of the Comptroller General 
constitute the performance of duties explicitly conferred by 
the Constitution on the President to execute laws enacted by 
Congress. Exercising judgment concerning facts that affect 
the application of the law is precisely the type of action per-
formed by the President through officers appointed by him 
charged with implementing a statute. Interpreting a law 
enacted by Congress is a duty expressly placed by the Con-
stitution, in the first instance, on the President by the man-
date of Article II, § 3, that the President "take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed." 
The executive nature of the Comptroller General's func-
tions under the Act is revealed in § 252(a)(3): 
"The [Presidential] order must provide for reductions in 
the manner specified in section 251(a)(3), must incorpo-
rate the provisions of the [Comptroller General's] report 
submitted under section 251(b), and must be consistent 
with such report in all respects. The President may not 
modify or recalculate any of the estimates, determina-
tions, specifications, bases, amounts, or percentages set 
forth in the report submitted under section 251(b) in 
determining the reductions to be specified in the order 
with respect to programs, projects, and activities, or 
with respect to budget activities, within an account 
.... " (emphasis added). 
The Act thus commands the President himself to carry out, 
without the slightest variation, the directive of the Comptrol-
ler General as to the reductions to be made. Under the Act, 
the President has no choice or voice and (with exceptions not 
relevant to the Constitutional issues presented) no opportu-
nity to exercise judgment with respect to those reductions. 6 
6 A further example is provided by § 251(d)(3)(A) of the Act. Under 
this provision, the President can terminate certain defense contracts and 
shift the monies thus saved to other defense needs. However, under 
§ 251(d)(3)(B) the President can do that only if the Comptroller General 
certifies that the President has accurately assessed the relevant financial 
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It is apparent, then, that Congress has placed executive 
power in the hands of an officer who is subject to removal 
only by Congress. The plain language of § 251 of the Act 
requires the Comptroller General to perform functions and 
duties and to make decisions binding on the President with 
respect to duties which the Constitution entrusts to the Pres-
ident. This the Constitution will not permit. 7 
VI 
We now turn to the final issue of remedy. Appellants 
urge that rather than striking down § 251 and invalidating the 
significant powers Congress vested in the the Comptroller 
General, we should take the lesser course of nullifying the 
statutory provisions of the 1921 Act that authorizes Congress 
to remove of the Comptroller General. The effect of this 
would be to make the Comptroller General removable by the 
President, and appellants suggest that this is the result Con-
gress would prefer. However, to follow that course, the 
Court would be obliged to decide which of two important pro-
visions enacted by Congress, i. e., § 251 or 31 U. S. C. 
703(e)(1), should prevail. We have already concluded that 
the 1921 Act contemplates and intended the Comptroller 
General to be an officer of Congress subservient to its will. 
Thus appellant's argument would require this Court to 
undertake a weighing of the importance Congress-in 1921-
attached to the removal provisions, as well as in other subse-
quent enactments, 8 against the importance it placed on the 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. 
considerations. Plainly the Act empowers the Comptroller General to 
overrule the judgment of the President as to how the law is to be exe-
cuted-in this example, as to a matter of national defense. 
7 Because we conclude that the Comptroller General may not exercise 
the powers conferred upon him by the Act, we have no occasion for consid-
ering appellees' other challenge to the Act: that the assignment of powers 
to the Comptroller General violates the delegation doctrine, see, e. g., 
A. L . A . Schechter Poultry Corp . v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935). 
8 See, e. g., 2 U. S. C. A. § 687 (West. 1985) (duty to bring suit to re-
quire release of impounded budget authority); 42 U. S. C. § 6384(a) (1982) 
(duty to impose civil penalties under the Energy Policy and Conservation 
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Severance at this late date of the removal provisions en-
acted 65 years ago would significantly alter the role of the 
Comptroller General's role by making him subservient to the 
Executive Branch. Recasting the Comptroller General as 
an officer of the Executive Branch would alter the balance 
that Congress had in mind in drafting the Balanced Budget 
and Emergency Deficit Control Act, to say nothing of the 
wide array of other tasks and duties Congress has assigned 
the Comptroller General in other statutes. 
Fortunately, this is a thicket we need not enter. In 
§ 274(f), Congress has explicitly provided "fallback" provi-
sions in the Act itself that take effect "[i]n the event that any 
of the reporting procedures described in section 251 are in-
validated," § 274(f)(1). The fallback provisions are "'fully 
operative as a law,"' Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 108 
(1976) (quoting Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Com-
mission, 286 U. S. 210, 234 (1932). Thus, assuming appel-
lants are correct in urging that this matter must be resolved 
on the basis of Congressional intent, the intent appears to 
have been for § 274(f) to be given effect as written. 
VII 
We conclude the District Court correctly held that the 
powers vested in the Comptroller General under § 251 violate 
the command of the Constitution that the President "shall 
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." 
This judgment is stayed for a period not to exceed 60 days 
to permit Congress to implement the fallback provisions. 
Act of 1975); 15 U. S. C. § 1862 (1982) (member of Chrysler Corporation 
Loan Guarantee Board); 45 U. S. C. § 711(d)(1)(C) (1982), as amended by 
Pub. L. No. 98-181, tit. II, § 2003(c)(l), 9 Stat. 1297 (1983) (member of 
Board of Directors of United States Railway Association); 31 U. S. C. A. 
§§ 3551-56 (West. Supp. 1985) (authority to consider bid protests under 
Competition in Contracting Act of 1984). 
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voting to affirm as to the importance of a single opinion. 
Accordingly, I will do my best to accommodate suggestions so that 
we can speak with a one voice. 
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June 2, 1986 
Re: 85-1377 - Bowsher v. Synar 
85-1388 - United States Senate v. Synar 
85-1379 - O'Neil v. Synar 
Dear Chief, 
I share your view that the Court should 
"speak with one voice• in this case. I do, however, 
have some substantial concerns with the present draft 
of the opinion. In the hope that the Court will be 
able to forge a consensus in a case of such grave 
importance to the Nation, I submit these concerns to 
you for your consideration. 
My review of the Conference notes indicates 
that, with the possible exception of Bill Rehnquist, 
those who voted to affirm hoped to make sure that the 
opinion not cast doubt on the constitutionality of 
independe~agenc1e • ear tat t e op1nion as now 
written, especially Part III, does just that. For 
example, the draft discusses Myers extensively, and 
suggests that it stands for the general proposition 
that the power to appoint carries with it the general 
power to remove. Yet, with the exception of quoting 
some general language about separation of powers, the 
draft disregards Humphrey's Executor almost entirely. 
As I read Humphrey's, it Iim1ts Myers considerably by 
suggesting that Congress can impose significant 
limitations on the President's removal power over 
executive officers even if they perform •executive 
functions.• 
As I read your draft, it suggests that the 
constitutional infirmity of the Act lies in the fact 
that the President does not have the power to remove 
the Comptroller General. n my v1ew, !1rtse y ::ne 
obv~e 1s e pro lem: The infirmity lies in the fact 
the Congress does have the power to remove, not in the 
fact that the President does not. Although the Court 
has never read the Constitution to require that each 
branch of Government be "hermetically sealed" from the 
others, it has consistently condemned any effort by 
one branch to assume the duties of another. This was 
the message of Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 
u.s. 579 (1952), as well as of Buckley v. Yaleo, 424 
u.s. 1, 121 (1976), both of which expressed a deep 
suspicion of any coalescence of executive and 
legislative functions in the same branch. The point 
was made most recently in your opinion for the Court 
in INS v. Chadha, 462 u.s. 919 (1983), a case that I 
fino-central to any consideration of the validity of 
the Deficit Control Act. Once again, the Court made 
clear that Congress may not both create laws and 
implement them. p 1t 1n t e op1nion, 
"Cong~st abide by its delegation of authority 
until that delegation is legislatively altered or 
revoked." Id., at 955. In my view, Gramm-Rudman is 
unconstitut1onal for precisely the same reasons: By 
giving itself the sole power to remove the Comptroller 
General, Congress has retained so much control over 
the office that it is, in effect, participating in the 
execution of the law it created. In your words, by 
not "abid[ing] by its delegation," Congress has gone 
beyond its constitutionally allocated function as a 
lawmaker. This kind of aggrandizement, our cases make 
clear, is impermissible. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
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JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL June 2, 1986 
Re: No. 85-1377 - ;Bowsher v. Synar 
Dear Chief: 
Like Jps, it was my understanding that the 
Court's opinion in this case would rest on the 
proposition that Congress may not retain the 
power to remove--even by joint resolution--an 
officer to whom executive functions have been 
delegated. Once the extent of Congress' control 
over the Comptroller General and the nature of 
the duties given that officer are made clear, 
nothing more need be said. Your current draft's 
focus on the need for the President to be 
"'master in his own house'" raises a host of 
important issues--including the propriety of 
independent agencies--that we do not have to 
consider at this time. 
Sincerely, 
T.M. 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
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Jluprtmt Of&tnrl of tlr~ ~nitt~ i'bdt• 
••Jrinllhm. ~. Of. 2llbi.ll~ 
June 2, 1986 
Re: 85-1377 Bowsher v. Synar 
85-1378 - United States Senate v. Synar 
85-1379 - O'Neill v. Synar 
Dear Chief: 
As I read your opinion, you propose to hold that the 
functions assigned to the Comptroller General must be 
assigned to an officer removable by the President of the 
United States. I do not agree with this rationale and will 
not be able to join your opinion unless it is substantially 
revised. 
It was my understanding of the consensus at Conference 
that the rationale of the decision was that the function 
performed by the Comptroller General could not be performed 
by an arm of the Legislature unless Congress itself 
performed that function by the normal process of legislating 
described in Chadha. In other words, the central rationale 
should rest on Chadha rather than Myers. I think your 
pinion casts substantial doubt on the legal status of 
ndependent agencies and that it would be a serious mistake 
or the Court to adopt this approach. 
If others do not agree, I shall of course be writing 
separately. 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.Su.prtntt <!fltlttt af tlft ~tb ,i\tafts 
1tulfing~ ~. <!f. 20gt'l-~ / 
June 3, 1986 




Please join me. 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The . Conference 
Bowsher v. Synar 
United States Senate v. Synar 
O'Neill v. Synar 
Sincerely, 
June 3, 1986 
85-1377 Bowsher v. Synar 
Dear Chief: 
On the basis of a ore1iminRry reading of vour op'n-
ion, 1 share generally the views expressed by other Justices 
who have written you. 
1 could not ioin an opinion that casts substantial 
doubt on the constitutionality of the independent aqencies, 
and do not think the vote at Confprqnce supports such a 
vi e\'-7. 
It is nevertheless helpful tn have a draft of this 
important opinion early in June, and 1 fully agree as to the 
desirability of our sp@akinq "with one voice." 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
:Lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
RE: 
.:iu.prmtt Qtltlttt of tqt ~b .;italtg 
Jfaglfi:nghtn. ~. <q. 20.?J!..;J 
Juen 3, 1986 
85-1377) - Bowsher v. Synar 
85-1378) - U.S. Senate v. Synar 
85-1379) - O'Neill v. SynaE 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
You have all received memos now commenting on rny 
first draft in the aoav ase. As I think you are aware, 
this was a '~ush job" bu one on which I had been giving 
a good deal of thought efore the writing began. 
Indeed, I find nothing to disagree with in any of the) vJuw ! 
four memos I have received, and I will have a second draft 
out as soon as I clear the decks from my two-day meeting 
with the Federal Judicial Cen r. 
CHAMISERS 01" 
.JUSTICE w .. . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
Dear Chief, 
~tmt Qicnri cf tift ~b .itaus 
.. uJtinghtn. J. Qi. 211.?,.~ 
June 3, 1986 
Bowsher v. Synar 
Nos. 85-1377, -1378, -1379 
I agree with what has been said by Sandra, John and Thurgood 
that the reasoning of the opinion in this case must be that 
Congress cannot retain the power to remove an officer charged 
with executing the law, and that the opinion should not rely on 
the rationale that the President must have power to remove such 
officers. Moreover, I think it very important that the opinion 
explain the basis and importance of this distinction, since it is 
only by doing so that we shall make clear that we are not 
questioning the viability of independent agencies. 
The phrase "separation of powers" broadly describes a number 
of distinct concerns that are embodied in the framework of our 
Government. The most basic and important of these is expressed 
by Montesquieu's famous maxim: that the power to legislate, the 
power to execute, and the power to adjudicate be controlled by 
separate entities. Whether this separation has been observed 
does not depend upon the formal designation of an officer as 
being within one or another branch of Government. Rather, it 
depends upon which branch holds the power actually to control 
that officer. Congress cannot retain the power directly to 
control an officer to whom it has delegated the task of executing 
a law whether that officer is formally designated an officer of 
the legislature or of the executive branch. Moreover, as the 
Framers correctly understood (and we have elevated this 
understanding to the status of constitutional presumption), the 
power to control is conferred by the power to remove. Thus, to 
the extent that Congress retains the power to remove a particular 
officer, it possesses the power to control that officer's 
performance. It is for this reason, and not because the power to 
remove is somehow "inherently executive" that the power to remove 
is entangled in separation of powers questions. 
A distinct "separation of powers" issue concerns the 
Framers' choice to place execution of the law under the control 
of a single President accountable to the entire nation. However, 
while the decision to have a unitary executive is generally 
included under the "separation of powers" rubric, it reflects 
concerns that are different from those that motivated the Framers 
to separate the powers of legislation, execution and 
adjudication: the Framers created three independent branches 
primarily because they feared that tyranny would result if too 
-2-
much political control became concentrated in a single entity; 
the Framers established a unitary executive primarily to ensure 
more efficient and accountable government. Thus, while a law 
qualifying the President's power to remove implicates 
constitutional concerns, the concerns implicated are different 
from those implicated if Congress retains removal power itself. 
Myers and Humphrey's Executors can be understood in light of 
this distinction. In Myers, Congress retained power to 
participate in the removal process by requiring Senate approval 
for the removal of an officer performing executive functions. 
This gave Congress direct control over an officer executing the 
law and thus violated the fundamental precept that Congress not 
control execution in addition to legislation. In Humphrey's 
Executors, on the other hand, Congress did not itself participate 
in the removal process, but simply limited the President's power 
to remove at will. In upholding the provisions for removal of 
FTC Commissioners, Humphrey's Executors made clear that the 
dictum in Myers suggesting that the President's removal power 
must remain unfettered was incorrect. 
My concern is that by not making the distinction between 
Myers and Humphrey's Executors express, the opinion will give 
credence to the view--strongly suggested by the District Court--
that Humphrey's Executors was wrong and that the Myers dictum was 
correct. I think that the opinion in this case must expressly 
draw the distinction between Congress having the power to remove 
and the President not having that power, and must clearly explain 
that our decision is based solely on the fact that Congress has 
removal power (and thus control over) the officer charged with 
executing the Budget Deficit Act. 
I think that the opinion also should reaffirm the holding in 
Humphrey's Executors that Congress can create independent 
agencies (i.e., agencies staffed by officers not removable at the 
President's pleasure). The District Court opinion includes a lot 
of dictum that questions the continuing validity of Humphrey's 
Executors. This dictum is simply wrong. The notion that 
Congress can to some extent limit the President's power to remove 
as long as Congress does not itself participate in the removal 
process is no longer open to question. Indeed, the First 
Congress limited the President's power to remove the Comptroller 
two weeks after the so-called "Decision of 1789." In addition, 
the ICC, the United States Shipping Board (now the Federal 
Maritime Commission), the FTC, and perhaps other independent 
agencies, were created by the Congress long before our decision 
in Humphrey's Executors. Finally, even were there some reason to 
doubt the strength of the conclusion in Humphrey's Executors, a 
very large part of Government has been developed in reliance on 
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After reviewing carefully the various comments and memos, (/1 
I conclude the essence of the problem is whether we skin the / 
tiger from the neck to the tail or vice versa. Either way suits me, 
and the printer is now turning the tirJer around. The hide, however, 
will look the same - at least as I Sbe it. 
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THOMAS P. O'NEILL, JR., SPEAKER OF THE UNITED 
STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
ET AL., APPELLANTS 
85-1379 v. 
MIKE SYNAR, MEMBER OF 
CONGRESS, ET AL. 
ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
[June-, 1986] 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
The question presented on these appeals is whether the 
assignment by Congress to the Comptroller General of the 
United States of certain functions under the Balanced Budget 
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 violates the doc-
trine of separation of powers. 
2 
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I 
A 
On December 12, 1985, the President signed into law the 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, 
Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037, popuiarly known as the 
"Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act." The purpose of the Act is 
to eliminate the federal budget deficit. To that end, the Act 
sets a "maximum deficit amount" for federal spending for 
each of fiscal years 1986 through 1991. The size of that max-
imum deficit amount progressively reduces to zero in fiscal 
year 1991. If in any fiscal year the federal budget deficit ex-
ceeds the maximum deficit amount by more than a specified 
sum, the Act requires across-the-board cuts in federal spend-
ing to reach the targeted deficit level, with half of the cuts 
made in defense programs and the other half made to non-
defense programs. The Act exempts certain priority pro-
grams from these cuts. § 255. 
These "automatic" reductions are accomplished through a 
rather complicated procedure, spelled out in § 251, the so-
called "reporting provisions" of the Act. Each year, the 
Directors of the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") 
and the Congressional Budget Office ("CEO") independently 
estimate the amount of the federal budget deficit for the 
upcoming fiscal year. If that deficit exceeds the maximum 
targetted deficit amount for that fiscal year by more than a 
specified amount, the Directors of OMB and CEO independ-
ently calculate, on a program-by-program basis, the budget 
reductions necessary to ensure that the deficit does not ex-
ceed the maximum deficit amount. The Act then requires 
the Directors to report jointly their deficit estimates and 
budget reduction calculations to the Comptroller General. 
The Comptroller General, after reviewing the Directors' 
reports, then reports his conclusions to the President. 
§ 251(b). The President in turn must issue a "sequestration" 
order mandating the spending reductions specified by the 
Comptroller General. § 252. There follows a period during 
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which Congress may by legislation reduce spending to obvi-
ate, in whole or in part, the need for the sequestration order. 
If such reductions are not enacted, the sequestration order 
becomes effective and the spending reductions included in 
that order are made. 
Anticipating constitutional challenge to these procedures, 
the Act also contains a "fallback" deficit reduction process to 
take effect "[i]n the event that any of the reporting proce-
dures described in § 251 are invalidated." § 274(f). Under 
these provisions, the report prepared by the Directors of 
OMB and the CEO is submitted directly to a specially-
created Temporary Joint Committee on Deficit Reduction, 
which must report in five days to both Houses a joint resolu-
tion setting forth the content of the Directors' report. Con-
gress then must vote on the resolution under special rules, 
·which render amendments out of order. If the resolution is 
passed and signed by the President, it then serves as the 
basis for a Presidential sequestration order. 
B 
Within hours of the President's signing of the Act, 1 
Congressman_§m_ar, who had voted against the Act, filed a 
complaint seeking declaratory relief that the Act was uncon-
stitutional. El ven other mbers later joined gress-
man Synar's suit. A virtually igent1ca g,wsuit was also filed 
by ~ional Treasury Employees Union. The Union 
alleged that its members had been injured as a result of the 
Act's automatic spending reduction provisions, which have 
suspended certain cost-of-living benefit increases to the 
Union's members. 2 
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A three-judge District Court, appointed pursuant to 2 
U. S. C. § 922(a)(5), invalidated the reporting provisions. 
Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D DC 1986) 
(Scalia, Johnson, Gasch, JJ.). The District Court concluded 
that the Union had standing to challenge the Act since the 
members ~ suffered actual injury by suspen-
sion of certain benefit increases. The District Court also 
concluded that Congressman Synar and his fellow Members 
had standing under the so-called "Congressional standing" 
doctrine. See, Barnes v. Kline, 759 F. 2d 21, 41 (CADC 
1985)) t;ert. granted, No. 85-781 (March 3, 1986). 
Th¥'"District Court next rejected appellees' challenge that 
the Act violated the delegation doctrine. The court ex-
pressed no doubt that the Act delegated broad authority, but 
delegation of similarly broad authority has been upheld in 
past cases. Thev1Jistrict Court observed that in Yakus v. 
United States, 321 U. S. 414, 420 (1944) this Court upheld a 
statute that delegated to an unelected "Price Administrator" 
the power "to promulgate regulations fixing prices of com-
modities." Moreover, in the---District Court's view, the Act 
adequately confined the exercise of administrative discretion. 
The District Court concluded that "the totality of the Act's ( 
standards, definitions, context, and reference to past admin-
istrative practice provides an adequate 'intelligible principle' 
to guide and confine administrative decisionmaking." 626 F. 
Supp., at 1389. 
Although the District Court concluded that the Act sur-
vived a delegation doctrine challenge, ~~e of 
the omptro er enera m t e deficit reauction process 
violate t e separatiOn of powers doctrine. he court first 
expl · at t e Comptroller eneral exercises executive 
functions under the Act. However, the Comptroller Gen-
eral, while appointed by the President with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, is removable not by the Pre§.ident_ but 
onlz_ by a ~'i.ionaUillnt re~lB.~by impeachment. 
The District Court reasoned that this' arrangement could not 
. . 
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v 
be sustained under this Court's dec~ions in Myers v. United 
States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), and 1Iumphrey's Executor v. 
United States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935). Under the separation 
of powers established by the Framers of the Constitution, 
the court concluded, Congress may not retain the power of 
removal over an officer performing executive functions. The 
Congressional removal power created a "here-and-now sub-
servience" of the Comptroller General to Congress. 602 F. 
Supp., at 1392. The istrict Court therefore held that 
"since the owers conferred u on the Comptroller Gen-
er.alas part of the automatic deficit re uction process are 
e~v~ .e~wers, which cannot constitutionally be exer-
cised by ailomcer removable by Congress, those powers 
cannot be exercised and therefore the auto 1 eficit 
reduction process to which they are are central cannot be 
implemented:" -~
I d., at 1403. 
Appeals were taken directly to this Court pursuant to 
§ 274(b) of the Act. We noted probable jurisdiction and ex-




is whether the Members of Congress, :5: ~~~ 
members o the ational Treasury Employees Union, or the _.. 
Union itself have standing to challenge the constitutionality 
of the Act in question. It is clear that members of the 
Union, one of whom is an appellee here, will sustain injury 
by not receiving a scheduled increase in benefits. See 
§ 252(a)(6)(C)(i); 602 F. Supp., at 1381. This is sufficient to 
confer standing under§ 274(a)(2) and Article III. We there-
fore need not consider the standing issue as to the Union or 
Members of Congress. See Secretary of the Interior v. Cali-
fornia, 464 U. S. 312, 319 n. 3 (1984). Cf. International 
Union, UAW v. Brock, -- U.S. -- (1986); Burke v. 
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Barnes, supra. Accordingly, we turn to the merits of the 
case. 
III 
We noted recently that "[t]he Constitution sought to divide 
the delegated powers of the new Federal Government into 
three defined categories, Legislative, Executive, and Judi-
cial." INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 951 (1983). The 
declared ~oseoTseparating and dividing the powers of 
government, of course, ~as t~di~s~ Qo_:ver the better to 
secure liberty." Youngstown heet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
343 U. S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice 
Jackson's words echo the famous warning of Montesquieu, 
quoted by James Madison in The Federalist No. 47, that 
"'there can be no liberty where the legislative and executive I 
powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates 
... .'" The Federalist No. 47, p. 325 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
Even a cursory examination of the Constitution reveals the 
influence of Montesquieu's thesis that checks and balances 
were the foundation of a structure of government that would 
protect liberty. The Framers provided a vigorous legisla-
tive branch and a separate and wholly independent executive 
branch, with each branch responsible ultimately to the peo-
ple. The Framers also provided for a judicial branch equally 
independent with "[t]he judicial Power . .. extend[ing] to all 
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution 
and the laws of the United States." Art. III, § 2. 
Other, more subtle, examples ~arated QOWers ar~ evi-
dentas welLUnlike parliamentary systems such as that of 
Great Britain, no person w_E.o is_ ~d
States ma~ve as a~ of the ~ngress. Art. I, § 6. 
Moreover, unTII<e parliamentary systems, the President, 
under Article II, is responsible not to the Congress but to the 
people, subject only to impeachment proceedings which are 
exercised by the two Houses as representatives of the peo-
ple. Art. II, § 4. And even in the impeachment of a Presi-
dent the presiding officer of the ultimate tribunal is not a 
-. 
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member of the legislative branch, but the Chief Justice of the 
United States. Art I, § 2. 
That this system of division and separation of powers is 
productive of conflicts, confusion, and discordance at times is 
inherent, but it was deliberately so structured to assure full, 
vigorous and open debate on the great issues affecting the 
people and to provide avenues for the operation of checks on 
the exercise of governmental power. 
The Constitution does not contemplate an active role for 
Congress in the supervision of officers charged with the exe-
cution of the laws it enacts. The President appoints "Offi-
cers of the United States" with the "Advice and Consent of 
the Senate .... " Article II, § 2. Once the appointment 
has been made and confirmed, however, the Constitution ex-
plicitly provides for removal of Officers of the United States 
by Congress only upon impeachment by the House of Repre-
sentatives and conviction by the Senate. An impeachment 
by the House and trial by the Senate can rest only on "Trea-
son, Bribery or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." Ar-
ticle II, § 4. A direct Congressional role in the removal of 
Officers of the United States beyond this limited one is incon-
sistent with separation of powers. 
This was made clear in debate in the First Congress in 
1789. When Congress considered an amendment to a bill 
establishing the Department of Foreign Affairs, the debate 
centered around whether the Congress "should recognize and 
declare the power of the President under the Constitution to 
remove the Secretary of Foreign Affairs without the advice 
and consent of the Senate." Myers, supra, 272 U. S., at 
114. James Madison urged rejection of a Congressional role 
in the removal of Executive Branch officers, other than by 
impeachment, saying in debate: 
Perhaps there was no argument urged with more suc-
cess, or more plausibly grounded against the Constitu-
tion, under which we are now deliberating, than that 
founded on the mingling of the Executive and Legisla-
8 
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tive branches of the Government in one body. It has 
been objected, that the Senate have too much of the Ex-
ecutive power even, by having a control over the Presi-
dent in the appointment to office. Now, shall we extend 
this connexion between the Legislative. and Executive 
departments, which will strengthen the objection, and 
diminish the responsibility we have in the head of the 
Executive? 1 Annals of Cong. 380. 
Madison's position ultimately prevailed, and a Congressional 
role in the removal process was rejected. This "Decision of 
1789" provides "contemporaneous and weighty evidence" of 
the Constitution's meaning since many of the members of the 
first Congress "had taken part in framing that instrument." 
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783, 790 (1983). 3 
This Court first directly addressed this issue in Myers v. 
United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1925). At issue in Myers was a 
statute providing that certain postmasters could be removed 
only "by and with the consent of the Senate." The President 
removed one such postmaster without Senate approval, and a 
lawsuit ensued. Chief Justice Taft, writing for the Court, 
declared the statute unconstitutional on the ground that for 
Congress to "draw to itself, or to either branch of it, the 
power to remove or the right to participate in the exercise of 
that power ... would be ... to infringe the constitutional 
3 The First Congress included [17] members who had been delegates to 
the Philadelphia Convention: 
IN THE SENATE 
Richard Bassett (Delaware) 
Pierce Butler (South Carolina) 
William Few (Georgia) 
William Samuel Johnson 
(Connecticut) 
John Langdon (New Hampshire) 
Robert Morris (Pennsylvania) 
William Paterson (New Jersey) 
George Read (Delaware) 
Rufus King (New York) 
IN THE HOUSE 
Abraham Baldwin (Georgia) 
Daniel Carroll (Maryland) 
George Clymer (Pennsylvania) 
Thomas FitzSimmons (Pennsylvania) 
Nicholas Gilman (New Hampshire) 
James Madison (Virginia) 
Roger Sherman (Connecticut) 
Hugh Williamson (North Carolina) 
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principle of the separation of governmental powers." 272 
U. S., at 161. 
A decade later, in Humphrey's Executors v. United States, 
295 U. S. 602 (1935) :rerred upon heavily by appellants, a 
Federal Trade Commissioner who had been removed by the 
Pres~ay. The relevant statute permitted 
re nt," but only_ "fur inefficien_:y, ne-
glect of duty, or malfeasance in office." Justice Sutherland, 
speakillgror the Court-;upheld the statute. The Court char-
acterized the Federal Traae CommiSSioner as an officer who 
"occupies no place in the executive department and who exer-
cises no part of the executive power vested by the Constitu-
tion in the President," but acts only "in the discharge and ef-
fectuation of ... quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial powers, or 
as an [officer of an] agency of the legislative or judicial de-
partments of the governments." 295 U. S., at 628. As to 
such officers, the Court concluded, "illimitable power of re-
moval is not possessed by the President ... . " I d., at 629. 
Justice Sutherland's opinion for the Court also underscored 
the crucial role of separated powers in our system: 
"The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the 
three general departments of government entirely free 
from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, 
of either of the others, has often been stressed and is 
hardly open to serious question. So much is implied in 
the very fact of the separation of the powers of these de-
partments by the Constitution; and in the rule which rec-
ognizes their essential co-equality." 
295 U.S., at 629~. 
The Court reached a similar conclusion in Weiner v. United 
States, 357 U. S. 349 (1958), concluding that, under Hum-
phrey's Executors, the President had no unrestrained re-
moval authority over a member of the War Crimes 
Commission. 
Humphrey's Executors involved an issue not presented 
eitherm the Myer~ca~ or in this case-i. e., the ~ower of 
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Congress to limit the President's power to remove an officer 
"wholly disconnected from the executive department." 295 
U. S., at 630.~ At the same time, the Court cast no doubt on J 
the specific holding of Myers dealing with an executive officer 
that a direct Congressional role in the removal of such an offi-
cer is improper. 
In light of these precedents, we conclude that Congress 
cannot reserve for itself the powe~ranomcer 
charge Wlt t e execu 1on o the laws except by impeach-
men . o perm1 t e execu wn o t e aws tooe vestea in an 
o:ffiC"er answerable only to Congress would, in practical 
terms, reserve in Congress control over the execution of the 
laws. As the ~ourt observed, "Once an officer is ap-
pointed, it is only the~ can remove him, and not 
the authority that appointed him, that he must fear and, in 
the performance of his functions, obey." 602 F. Supp., at 
1401. The structure of the Constitution does not permit ) 
Congress to execute the laws and it follows Congress cannot 
grant to an officer under its control what it does not possess. 
Our decision in INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919 (1983), sup-
ports this conclusion. In Chadha, we strnel£ down a one 
house "legislative veto" provision by wh1ch each House of 
• Appellants therefore are wide of the mark in arguing that an affirm-
ance in this case requires casting doubt on the status of "independent" 
agencies because no issues involving such agencies are presented here. 
The statutes establishing independent agencies typically specify either that 
the agency members are removable by the President for specified causes, 
see, e. g., 15 U. S. C. § 41 (members of the Federal Trade Commission 
may be removed by the President "for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or mal-
feasance in office), or else do not specify a removal procedure, see, e. g., 2 
U. S. C. § 437c (Federal Election Commission). The issue in this case in-
volves nothing like these statutes, but rather a statute that provides for 
direct Congressional involvement-indeed control-over the decision to re-
move the Comptroller General. Appellants have referred us to no inde-
pendent agency whose members are removable by the Congress for certain 
causes short of impeachable offenses, as is the Comptroller General, see 
part IV infra. 
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Congress retained the power to reverse a decision Congress 
had expressly authorized the Attorney General to make: 
"Disagreement with the Attorney General's decision on 
Chadha's deportation-that is, Congress' decision to de-
port Chadha-no less than the Congress' original choice 
to delegate to the Attorney General the authority to 
make that decision, i11volves determinations of policy 
that Congress can implement in only one way; bicameral 
passage followed by presentment to the President. 
Congress must abide by its delegation of authority until 
that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked." 
462 U. S., at 954-955. 
To permit Congress or an officer controlled by Congress to 
execute the laws would be, in essence, to permit a Congres-
sional veto. Congress could simply remove, or threaten to l 
remove, an officer for executing the laws in any fashion found 
to be unsatisfactory to Congress. This kind of Congressional 
control over the execution of the laws, Chadha makes clear, 
is constitutionally impermissible. 
The dangers of Congressional usurpation of executive 
branch functions have long been recognized. "[T]he debates 
of the Constitutional Convention, and the Federalist Papers, 
are replete with expressions of fear that the Legislative 
Branch of the National Government will aggrandize itself at 
the expense of the other two branches." Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U. S., at 129. We have observed only recently "[t]he 
hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate 
Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to ac-
complish desirable objectives, must be resisted." 462 U. S., 
at 951. With t_!lese pri~ mind, we turn to consider-
ation of the nature offhe office of the Comptroller General. 
-------------------------------~ IV 
The Comptroller General heads the General Accounting 
Office, "an instrumentality of the United States Government 
independent of the executive departments," 31 U. S. C. 
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§ 702(a), which was created by Congress in 1921 as part of the 
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, 43 Stat. 23. Congress 
created the office because it believed that it "needed an offi-
cer responsible to it alone, to check upon the application of 
public funds in accordance with appropriations." H. Mans-
field, The Comptroller General: A Study in the Law and 
Practice of Financial Administration 65 (1939). 
It is clear that Congress has consistently viewed the 
Comptroller General as an officer of the Legislative Branch. 
( 
The Reorganization Acts of 1945 and 1949, for example, both 
stated that the Comptroller General and the GAO are "a part 
of the legislative branch of Government." 59 Stat. 616; 63 
Stat. 205. Similarly, i:p the Accounting and Audit Act of 
1950, Congress required the Comptroller General to conduct 
audits "as an agent of the Congress." 64 Stat. 835. 
Over the years, the Co32ptroller Gen~rals have also viewed 
themselves as part of the Le 'slative Branch. Inane of the 
early nnu eports o Comptroller General, the official seal 
of his office was described as reflecting: 
"the independence of judgment to be exercised by the 
General Accounting Office, subject to the control of the 
legislative branch . . . . The combination represents an 
agency of the Congress independent of other authority 
auditing and checking the expenditures of Government 
as required by law and subjecting any questions arising 
in that connection to quasi-judicial determination." 
Annual Report of the General Accounting Office, 1924, 
pp. 5-6. 
Comptroller GenEal Warren later testified that: "During 
most of my puolic life, ... I have been a member of the 
Legislative Branch. Even now, although heaaTng a great 
agency~ency of the Congress, and I am an agent of 
Congress." To Provide for the Reorganization of Agencies 
of the Government: Hearings on H. R. 3325 Before the House 
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(emphasis added). And, in one conflict during Comptroller 
General McCarl's tenure, he asserted his independence of the 
Executive Branch, stating: 
"Congress ... is ... the only authority to which there 
lies an appeal from the decision of this office .... I may 
not accept the opinion of any official, inclusive of the At-
torney General, as controlling my duty under the law." 
2 Comp. Gen. 784 (1923) (disregarding conclusion of the 
Attorney General, 33 Ops. Att'y Gen. 476 (1923) with re-
spect to interpretation of compensation statute). 
That the role and function of the Office of Comptroller Gen-
eral of the United States since its inception have been identi-
fied with the legislative branch in popular and political per-
ception is, of course, not dispositive. The critical aspects lie 
in the statute definin the Com troller General's OffiCe. The 
Comp ro er General must be nominated by the President 
from a list of three individuals recommended by the Speaker 
of the House of Representatives and the President pro tem-
pore of the Senate, see 31 U. S. C. § 703(a)(2), and confirmed --by the Senate. The Comptroller General is, however, re-
movable only by Congress. He may be removed "at any 
time" by a Joint Resolution of Congress resting on any one of 
the following bases: 
(i) permanent disability; (ii) inefficiency; (iii) neglect of 
duty; (iv) malfeasance; or (v) a felony or conduct involv-
ing moral turpitude." 
31 U. S. C. § 703(e)(1) (1982). 5 
This provision was included, as one Congressman ex-
plained in urging passage of the Act, because Congress "felt 
3 We reject appellants argument that consideration of the effect of a 
removal provision is not "ripe" until that provision is actually used. As 
the District Court concluded, "it is the Comptroller General's presumed de-
sire to avoid removal by pleasing Congress ... which creates the here-
and-now subservience to another branch that raises separation-of-powers 
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that [the Comptroller General] should be brought under the 
sole control of Congress, so that Congress at the moment 
when it found he was inefficient and was not carrying on the 
duties of his office as he should and as the Congress expected, 
could remove him without the long, tedious process of a trial 
by impeachment." 61 Cong. Rec. 1081 (1921) (Rep. Byrns). 
Against this background, we see no esca~om thELconclu-
sion £hat, bec<!:_use Congress ~etain~ removal authority 
over-the Comptroller General, he is not an officer of the Ex-
ec~tive Branch:- Every authority examineddemonstates 
that~troller General may not be entrusted with ex-
! 
ecutive powers. The remaining question is whether the 
Comptroller General has been assigned such powers in the 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. 
v 
The onsibility of the Comptroller General 
under the nstan 1s the preparation a "report." This 
report must con am etailed estimates of projected federal 
revenues and expenditures. The report must also specify 
the reductions, if any, necessary to reduce tfie deficit to the 
target for the appropriate fiscal year. The reductions must 
be set forth on a program-by-program basis. 
In preparing the report, the Comptroller General is to 
have "due regard" for the estimates and reductions set forth 
in a joint report submitted to him by the Director of CBO and 
the Director of OMB, the President's fiscal and budgetary ad-
visor. However, the Act plainly contemplates that the 
Comptroller General will exercise his independent judgment 
and evaluation with respect to those estimates. The Act 
also provides that the Comptroller General's report "shall 
explain fully any differences between the contents of such re-
~.· 




port and the report of the Directors." § 251(b)(2)(B). -1 ~ __ . _---?.. 
It is clear that ~ese nc wns of the Comptroller_General .:r-~  
constitute e pe ormance of duties exPlicit! conferred b (;i/Jil ~ ~ 
the~ it e re 1 nt to execute laws enacted by ~  
~ ;J~ . ..t-o 
~~k- f ·o 
£~~ 
~~ 
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Congress. Exercising judgi!lent concernin 
the a lication e aw is precise y_ th~ of action. per-
formed by the President through officers am;~ointed by him 
char~ting a statute. Interpreting a law 
enacte y Congress is a uty expressly placed by the Con-
stitution, in the first instance, on the President by the man-
date of Article II, § 3, that tht President "take Care that the 
La~s be faithfu!b:.. execpted." 
e executive nature of the Comptroller General's func-
tions under the Act is revealed in § 252(a)(3): 
"The [Presidential] order must provide for reductions in 
the manner specified in section 251(a)(3), must incorpo-
rate the provisions of the [Comptroller General's] report 
submitted under section 251(b), and must be consistent 
with such report in all respects. The President may not 
modify or recalculate any of the estimates, determina-
tions, specifications, bases, amounts, or percentages set 
forth in the report submitted under section 251(b) in 
determining the reductions to be specified in the order 
with respect to programs, projects, and activities, or 
with respect to budget activities, within an account 
.... " (emphasis added). 
The ct thus comma ds the President himself to carry out, 
without the shg test vanat10n, e~rol­
le~he...red!.ll:funs to Qe..~de. Under the Act, 
the President has no choice or voice and (with exceptions not 
relevant to the Constitutional issues presented) no opportu-
nity to exercise judgment with respect to those reductions. 6 
6 A further example is provided by § 251(d)(3)(A) of the Act. Under 
this provision, the President can terminate certain defense contracts and 
shift the monies thus saved to other defense needs. However, under 
§ 251(d)(3)(B) the President can do that only if the Com troller General 
certifies that the Pres1 ent nas accura e y assesse the relevant financial 
consideratfons. Plamly tfie Act empowers the Comptrolfer General to 
overru"1'e'ffie judgment of the President as to how the law is to be exe-
cuted-in this example, as to a matter of national defense. 
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It is apparent, then, tha~t Congress has placed executive 
power in the hands of an officer who is subject to removal py 
Co~s. e plain language of §"251 of the Act requires 
the Comptroller General to perform functions and to make 
decisions binding on the President with respect to duties 
which the Constitution entrusts to the President. The Con-
stitution does not pe~.rgaching the boundaries....or sepa-
rated powers in this fashion. 7 
VI 
We now turn to the final issue of remedy. Appellants 
urge ,that rather than striking down§ 251 and invalidating~the 
significant powers Congress vested in the the Comptroller 
General to meet a national fiscal emergency, we should take 
the lesser course of nullifying the statuto rov1 10 of the 
1921 ct at aut orizes ongress to remove of the Comp-
troller General. The effect or this would be to make tbe 
Comptroller General removable by the President, and appel-
lants suggest that this is the result Congress would prefer. 
Ho~r, to follow that C.Q1lrse, the Court would be obliged 
to decide which of t o im o ant rov1 ions enacted by Con-
gres ,t. e., § 251 or 31 U. S. C. 703(e)(1), should prevail. 
We have already concluded that the 1921 Act contemplates 
and intended the Comptroller General to be an officer of Con-
gress ultimately subservient to its will. Thus appellant's ar-
gument would require this Court to undertake a weighing of 
the importance Congress-in 1921-attached to the removal 
provisions, as well as in other subsequent enactments, 8 
7 Because we conclude that the Comptroller General may not exercise 
the powers conferred upon him by the Act, we have no occasion for consid-
ering appellees' other challenge to the Act: that the assignment of powers 
to th e Comptroller General violates t he delegatiOn doctrine, see, e. g., 
A. L. A. Sclrechter'"I1oulfry Corp. v. United States , 295 U. S. 495 (1935). 
8 See, e. g. , 2 U.S. C. A. §687 (West. 1985) (duty to bring suit tore-
quire release of impounded budget authority); 42 U. S. C. § 6384(a) (1982) 
(duty to impose civil penalties under the Energy Policy and Conservation 
Act of 1975); 15 U. S. C. § 1862 (1982) (member of Chrysler Corporation 
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against the importance it placed on the Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. 
Severance at this late date of the removal revisions en-
acte.Q_ 65 years ago would significant y alter the role of the 
Comptroller ITeneral's role by making him subservient to the 
Executive Branch. Recasting the Comptroller General as 
an officer of the Executive Branch would alter the balance 
that Congress had in mind in drafting the Balanced Budget 
and Emergency Deficit Control Act, to say nothing of the 
wide array of other tasks and duties Congress has assigned 
the Comptroller General in other statutes. 
Fortunately, this is a thicket we need n t en r. In 
§ 274(f), Congress has explicitly provided fallback' provi-
sions in the Act that take effect "[i]n the event ... any of the 
reporting _procedur~s cre·scribed in s ection 251 arej nvali-
dated," § 274(f)(l). 1 'he f:illbac1C provisions are "'fully -operative as a law,"' Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 108 
(1976) (quoting Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Com-
mission, 286 U. S. 210, 234 (1932). Thus, assuming appel-
lants are correct in urging that this matter must be resolved 
on the basis of Congressional intent, the intent appears to 
have been for § 274(f) to be given effect as written. 
VII 
No one can doubt that Congress and the President are con-
fronted with fiscal and economic problems of unprecedented 
magnitude, but "the fact that a given law or procedure is effi-
cient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of gov-
ernment, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to 
the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the 
primary objectives-or the hallmarks-of democratic govern-
ment .... " Chadha, supra, 462 U. 8., at 944. 
Loan Guarantee Board); 45 U. S. C. § 71l(d)(l)(C) (1982), as amended by 
Pub. L. No. 98-181, tit. II, § 2003(c)(l), 9 Stat. 1297 (1983) (member of 
Board of Directors of United States Railway Association); 31 U. S. C. A. 
§§ 3551-56 (West. Supp. 1985) (authority to consider bid protests under 
Competition in Contracting Act of 1984). 
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We conclude the District Court correctly held that the 
powers vested in the Comptroller General under § 251 violate 
the command of the Constitution that the Congress play no 
direct role in the execution of the laws. 
This judgment is stayed for a period not to exceed 60 days 
to permit Congress to implement the fallback provisions. 
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THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.iu.prnnt Qf01Ui Df tlft ~b .itattll 
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June 6, 1986 
Re: Nos. 85-1377, 85-1378, 85-1379, Bowsher v. Synar, etc. 
Dear Bill: 
You memo of June 6 strikes me as trying to decide some cases 
not here -- something I hope I generally avoid. At page 10 n.4, 
I think I've made it clear we are casting no doubt on the SEC, 
FTC, EPA, etc. In short, I can't escape a feeling you want an 
opinion for another case. 
However, I'll go over your memo closely, see to what extent I 
can accommodate your thoughts, and get back to you. 
Regards, 
•, . ) 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to Conference 
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.JUSTICE w .. . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
Dear Chief, 
,jttpT.nnt Qtolttt of firt ~b ~hdtg 
Jlulfi:nghm. ~.<If. 20~~~ 
Bowsher v. Synar 
Nos. 85-1377, -1378, -1379 
June 6, 1986 
Your second draft does indeed accommodate many of my 
concerns. However, I still have problems with sections of the 
opi~on that, I am afraid~~~t doubt ~9n the 
cont · uing viabilit of maEJ--if not all--~pendent 
administrative agencies. I refer in particular to: (1) the 
descr f pt i on of agency functions as "quasi-legislative" or "quasi-
judicial" in contradistinction to "executive" functions that only 
the President or officers removable at his pleasure , ~~y perform, 
and (2) the emphasis on whether an officer or agen~s within 
the Executive Branch. 
With respect to the first of these concerns, as you 
explained in Chadha, although we have referred to agency activity 
as "quasi-legislative" or "quasi-judicial" in nature, it is still 
executive acitivity. 462 u.s. 919, 953, n. 16 (1983). The 
importance of this insight is its recognition that the executive 
function consists of what Congress leaves to be done in order to 
implement the laws it passes. If Congress establishes standards 
for clean air in a law, establishing such standards is 
legislative; however, if Congress delegates the establishment of 
standards to an agency (within t he broad limits imposed by the 
nondelegation doctrine), this same task becomes executive. This 
is, it seems to me, one reason why overreaching by Congress is 
potentially more problematic than overreaching by the other 
branches of Government--Congress' power to choose how much to 
inc lude in a law and how much to leave to administrators gives 
the legislative branch the power to control to a large extent the 
duties and functions that will be left to the other branches. 
My concern is that reintroducing such notions as whether 
some function is "quasi-legislative" or "quasi-judicial" will 
encourage claims that all sorts of independent agency activity is 
neither, and that it must therefore be under the President's 
control. In other words, I am afraid that reintroducing this 
I 
analysis will cast doubt upon the legality of much of the work of 
independent administrative agencies despite disclaimers that the 
question is presented. This problem can easily be avoided simply 
by not using this terminology in the discussion. 
With respect to my second concern, I continue to believe 
that whether there is a separat i on of powers problem is a 
functional question, which depends upon which branch actually 
controls an officer charged with particular responsibilities. 
However, while labels such as "Legislative Officer" or "Executive 
~· 
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Officer" are themselves of no functional significance, they may 
be misleading. Passages in the opinion--particularly in Part V--
appear to suggest that an officer is an "Executive Officer" if he 
serves at the pleasure of the President and that officers 
performing tasks such as interpreting a law must be "Executive 
Officers." The im ortant oint is sim that the Constitution 
prohibits Congress aving power to contro an o 1cer who 
has been de egated exec v res 1 1es wnether or not that 
officer is called an "Executive Officer" or a "Legislative 
Officer." I woule prefer avoiding the use of such labels and 
instead discuss the issues in terms of whether Congress has 
removal power over an officer with executive responsibilities. 
( 
These are general concerns, and, as such, are not much help 
to you in writing this difficult opinion. I add the following 
specific suggestions in the hope that you will find them more 
usef~
First, rather than quoting the language from Humphrey's 
Executors, I would simply describe the result in that case. 
Thus, I suggest deleting the third through fifth sentences of the 
first full paragraph on page 9 and substituting something like 
the following: 
The Court upheld the statute, holding that 
"illimitable power of removal is not possessed by the 
President" with respect to certain kinds of 
administrative bodies that, like the FTC, were "created 
by Congress to carry into effect legislative policies" 
embodied in statutory enactments. 295 u.s., at 628-
629. The Court distinguished Myers, reaffirming its 
holding that congressional participation in the removal 
process of executive officers is unconstitutional, but 
"disapprov[ing]" expressions in that opinion "beyond 
the point involved." Id., at 626. 
In addition, I would delete the quoted language "wholly 
disconnected from the executive department" in the second line on 
page 10. If you think that some kind of clause is required at 
the end of the sentence, how about something like "with 
administrative responsibilities granted by Congress"? 
Second, after discussing the statutory provisions for 
congressional removal of the Comptroller General, Part IV 
concludes (at page 14): "Against this background; we see no 
escape from the conclusion that, because Congress has retained 
removal authority over the Comptroller General, he is not an 
officer of the Executive Branch. Every authority examined 
demonstrates that the Comptroller General may not be entrusted 
with executive powers." I suggest compressing these two 
sentences into one: "Against this background, we see no escape 
from the conclusion that, because Congress has retained removal 
authority over the Comptroller General, he may not be entrusted 
with executive powers." Also, rather than "executive powers," it 
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might be better to say something like "responsibility for 
executing legislative enactments.• 
Similarly, six lines from the top of page 17, you refer to 
"Recasting the Comptroller General as an officer of the Executive 
Branch ••.. • Would you consider deleting this phrase and simply 
beginning the sentence with •This"? 
as it is written, Part V strongly ~m2lies that qnly 
the t could execute functlons -such as th co itted to 
the ler Genera 1n ramm- u man-HQ1lings. This section 
may thus be read EOlmpiy that theAc_t.. would be unconstitutional 
even if it was committed to a truly independent agency {i.e., an 
agency whose officers were removable by neither Congress nor the 
President or whose officers were removable by the President only 
for cause). While it is not necessary to hold that the Act could 
be administered by an independent agency, it seems to me that 
there is a way to structure Part V that avoids any implications 
one way or the other: shifting the emphasis of the discussion 
from the fact that administrative duties such as those delegated 
in the Act must be entrusted to an officer controlled by the 
President to the fact that they may not be entrusted to an 
officer removable by Congress. Thus, I would r etain the first 
two paragraphs of Part V, but would frame the rest of that 
section along the following lines: - --------Petitioners suggest that the duties assigned to the Comptroller General in the Act are so mechanical 
that their performance does not constitute "execution 
of the law• in a meaningful sense. On the contrary, we 
think that these functions plainly entail execution of 
the law for constitutional purposes, and that therefore 
they cannot be performed by an officer removable by 
Congress. Interpreting and implementing a law enacted 
by Congress to carry out the legislative mandate is the 
very essence of "execution" of the law. Of course, 
Congress may define the scope of executive 
responsibility by making legislation more or less 
specific, i.e., by choosing how much to incorporate 
into the specific terms of a law and how much to leave 
to those responsible for that law's proper 
administration. However, as Chadha makes clear, having 
made its choice in drafting legislation, Congress' 
participation must end. Having chosen to le~ve certain 
tasks to be carried out by administrators, Congress 
cannot control the execution of its enactment by these 
administrators except by enacting a new law. 
By placing the responsibility for administration 
in the hands of an officer who is subject to removal 
only by itself, Congress has done exactly that in the 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 
1985. The plain language of §251 of the Act requires 
the Comptroller General to perform functions and to 
make binding decisions with respect to duties which the 
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Constitution requires be entrusted to an officer 
independent of congressional control. The Constitution 
does not permit breaching the boundaries of separated 
powers in this fashion. [footnote 7] 
Finally, I have several small points that I thought worth 
calling to your attention. 
(1) The paragraph in the middle of page 7 discusses 
Congress' role in the removal process of "Officers of the United 
States." However, if the Comptroller General were stripped of 
all his executive capacities might he not still be deemed an 
"Officer of the United States"? Yet, if he had no executive 
responsibilities, Congress might well be able to play a role in 
his removal. At the beginning of the paragraph and again later 
in the opinion, you use the phrase "officers charged with the 
execution of the laws." Is not this phrase preferable? 
(2) Rather than citing Schecter Poultry in footnote 7, I 
suggest citing a later case that more accurately reflects the law 
of nondelegation, such as Yakus v. United States, 321 u.s. 414 
(1944) 0 
(3) You state on page 16 that the effect of striking down 
the 1921 Act would be to make the Comptroller General removable 
by the President. I am somewhat hesitant to make this claim. 
There are many independent agencies whose heads are appointed for 
fixed terms and who are not removable by anyone. Given the 
intent of the 1921 Congress, a strong argument could be made that 
if the congressional removal provision is struck down, the 
Comptroller General should simply serve a term. Could you not 
simply delete this sentence? Along the same lines, I suggest 
changing the sentence at the beginning of the first full 
paragraph on page 17 to read: "Severance at this late date ••• 
would significantly alter the role of the Comptroller General by 
making him entirely independent of the Congress, possibly 
enhancing the ability of the Executive Branch to influence his 
performance." 
I apologize for the length of these suggestions. You have 
done a fine job with a difficult opinion under great time 
pressures. Given the importance of this case, however, I thought 
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.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
June 9, 1986 
Re: 85-1377 - Bowsher v. Synar 
85-1378 - United States Senate v. 
Synar 
85-1379 - O'Neill v. Synar 
Dear Chief: 
Affirmance of the judgment in this case can be 
supported on either a broad rationale or a narrow 
one. I think we should decide on which rationale to 
adopt before we address specific drafting problems. 
Let me briefly summarize the alternative rationales. 
The Broad Rationale 
Proposition 1 - Executive power can only be 
entrusted to the President, or to an officer 
removable by the President. 
Proposition 2 - The powers entrusted to the 
Comptroller General are executive powers. 
Proposition 3 - The Comptroller General is not 
removable by the President, and therefore may not be 
entrusted with executive powers. 
Conclusion - The statute is unconstitutional. 
The reason this rationale is too broad is that 
it would also invalidate (a) the fall-back provision 
in Sec. 274 which authorizes Congress itself to 
perform the same function as the Comptroller General; 
(b) a statute which authorized the functions to be 
performed by an independent agency such as the 
Federal Reserve Board; and (c) perhaps a statute 
which delegated the functions to a newly created 
- 2 -
executive agency whose officers have civil service 
status. 
The Narrow Rationale 
Proposition 1 - The lawmaking process is too 
complex to enable us to characterize every step in 
the process as exclusively "legislative• or 
"executive.• 
Proposition 2 - The functions performed by the 
Comptroller General under this statute could properly 
be characterized as "executive• if they were assigned 
to the President, the Secretary of the Treasury, or 
some other officer removable by the President. The 
same functions may properly be characterized as 
"legislative• if they are assigned to the Congress of 
the United States or to an agent of the Congress. 
Proposition 3 - In the statute before us 
Congress has characterized the Comptroller General's 
lawmak_ing activities as "legislative" because (a) it 
has assigned them to an officer of the Legislative 
Branch (both because Congress retains removal power 
and because the Comptroller General has long 
functioned primarily as a congressional agent)~ and 
(b) if that assignment is invalidated, Congress has 
decided to perform the functions itself. 
. Proposition 4 - If a lawmaking function of this 
importance is to be performed by the Legislative 
Branch, it must observe the constitutionally mandated 
procedures detailed in Chadha. 462 U.S. at 956-958. 
Neither one House nor an agent such as the Speaker or 
the Comptroller General can issue commands to the 
President of the United States. 
Conclusion - The statute is unconstitutional. 
Your circulating draft opinion adopts the broad 
rationale. In a case of this importance, I think it 
is always wise to adopt a narrow rationale if 
possible. I agree with the view that we should speak 
with "one voice• if possible, but I am afraid I will 
not be able to join an opinion that adopts the broad 
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rationale that is set forth in your present 
circulating draft. If you can substitute the Chadha 
rationale, I shall be happy to make specific 
suggestions for change. If not, it would probably 
save time for me to write separately. 
The Chief Justice 
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June 10, 1986 
Re: Nos. 85-1377, 85-1378, 85-1379, Bowsher v. Synar, etc. 
Dear John: 
Thank you for your memo dated June 9. I agree we should first 
determine the basic rationale of the opinion in this case. But I am 
not sure that we are as far apart as your memo suggests. 
What may seem to be a different view between us may result from a 
misreading of the second draft. That draft makes clear that the cen-
tral point is not your "proposition three" -- "the Comptroller General 
is not removable by the President, and therefore may not be entrusted 
with executive powers." On the contrary, the central point is that 
the Comptroller General is removable by Congress, and therefore may 
not be entrusted with executive powers. Part III states: "In light of 
these precedents, we conclude that Congress cannot reserve for itself 
the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the 
laws except by impeachment." Op. at 10. Part IV states: "Against 
this background, we see no escape from the conclusion that, because 
Congress has retained removal authority over the Comptroller General, 
he is not an officer of the Executive Branch." Op. at 14. Part V 
states: "It is apparent then, that Congress has placed executive pow-
ers in the hands ·of an officer who is subject to removal by Congress. 
. . . The Constitution does not permit breaching the boundaries of sepa-
rated powers in this fashion." Op. at 16. 
There is additional misunderstanding concerning the effect of the 
second draft on the fall-back provisions of the Act and on a variety 
of other actual and potential legislative schemes. The opinion would 
not invalidate the fall-back provisions of 5274 which essentially in• 
volve nothing more than superceding legislation. Those provisions 
require that Congress adopt, and the President sign, a new joint reso-
lution setting budget figures. I see nothing in the current draft 
that would suggest that such a procedure is unconstitutional. 
The ability of the Federal Reserve Board to undertake the func-
tions assigned to the Comptroller General under the Act is, of course, 
not before us. Even if it were, I confess that I do not understand 
your suggestion that the second draft would cast doubt on that abili-
ty, since, unlike the Comptroller General, the members of the Federal 
Reserve Board are removable by Congress · only by way of impeachment. 
Moreover, the opinion specifically distinguishes questions relating to 
the status of independent agencies. See Op. at 9-10 & n.4. Because 
of this distinguishing language, the opinion would not, as you sug-
gest, invalidate "a newly created executive agency whose officers have 
civil service status," if such an agency were ever created. 
I am also not sure that I can accept your characterization of your 
suggested approach as "the narrow rationale." To be sure, your ap-
proach might reserve some questions that my approach would answer. 
However, it is also clear that your "narrow rationale" would pronounce 
on issues that the currently circulating draft does not. For example, 
your "proposition two" is that the "functions [assigned the Comptrol-
ler General] may properly be characterized as 'legislative'" merely 
because "they are assigned to the Congress of the United States or to 
an agent of the Congress." This strikes me as a fairly sweeping prop-
osition that might unsettle a lot of law in this area. 
Some of the changes I am working on in response to Bill Brennan's 
memo will reemphasize that the opinion speaks in terms of Congressio-
nal removal. Those changes may eliminate or at least narrow the area 
of disagreement between us. ~erhaps after these changes have been 
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June 12, 1986 
85-1377 Bowsher v. Synar 
Dear Chief: 
Please ioin me in your second draft of an opinion 
for the Court. 
1 have reread your opinion with some care, and it 
is in accord with my understanding of our Conference vote. 
1 would have no ob1ection, however, to some of the changes 
suggested by ot~er Justices so long as the basic framework 
of your analvsis remains the same. 
I certainly do not want to undercut the type of 
independence the great administrative agencies have enjoyed, 
and 1 do not thi.nk your opinion - as now drafted - does 
this. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
Jn.vrttttt QfDUrt .llf t!tt ~ittb Jtatt.s' 
'Jiulfi:ttgton. ~. (If. 2llbi,.~. 
June 12, 1986 
Nos. 85-1377, 85-1378 & 85-1379 Bowsher 
v. Synar, U. S. Senate v. Synar & 
O'Neill v. Synar 
Dear Chief, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CH.O.MI!I!!:AS Of' 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
,tluprtnu ~1t1tti &rf tift ~ttb jlbdt• 
..-u.frington. ~. ~ 2ll~Jt.~ 
June 16, 1986 
Re: 85-1377 - Bowsher v. Synar 
85-1378 - United States Senate v. Synar 
85-1379 - O'Neill v. Synar 
Dear Chief: 
Although I agree with Parts I and II of your 
circulating opinion, and with much of what you have written 
in Part IV, I think ~n has the better of the argument on 
the issue as you have framed it concerning the removal 
power. I will therefore write out my own view of the case, 
which is patterned after the ra 1ona set forth in 
my letter June 9th. I have almost finished with the first 
draft and trust that I will not hold you up too long. 
Respectfully, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
85-1377 Bowsher v. Synar (Mike) 
CJ for the Court 5/5/86 
1st draft 5/31/86 
2nd draft 6/5/86 
3rd draft 6/12/86 
4th draft 6/27/86 
6th draft 7/2/86 
7th draft 7/3/86 





1st draft 6/16/86 
2nd draft 7/1/86 
JPS concurring in the judgment 
1st draft 6/27/86 
2nd draft 7/2/86 
Joined by 6/27/86 
HAB dissenting 
1st draft 6/28/86 
JPS will write own view of the case 6/16/86 
BRW will dissent 6/2/86 
JPS may write separately 6/2/86 
·'' '· 
